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THE EFFECTS OF TAX-BASED SAVING
INCENTIVES ON SAVING AND WEALTH
ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates research examining the effects of tax-based saving incentives on private
and national saving. Several factors make this an unusually difficult problem, First, households that
participate in, or are eligible for, saving incentive plans have systematically stronger tastes for saving
than other households. Second, the data indicate thathouseholds with saving incentives have taken
on more debt than other households. Third, significant changes in the 1980s in financial markets,
pensions, social security, and notilnancial assets interacted with the expansion of saving incentives.
Fourth, saving incentive accounts represent pre-tax balances, whereas conventional taxable accounts
represent post-tax balances. Fifth, the fact thatemployer contributions to saving incentive plans are
apart of total employee compensation is typically ignored.
A major theme of this paper is that analyses that ignore these issues overstate the impact of
saving incentives on saving. We show that accounting for these factors largely or completely
eliminates the estimated positive impact of saving incentives on saving found in the literature.
Thus, we conclude that little if any of the overall contributions to existing saving incentives have


















American saving rates fell dramatically in the 1980s and have remained low since then.
The decline in saving has raised concerns that the economy may be unable to finance
investment and sustain growth, and that households may not be saving adequately for
retirement. One response to these concerns has been the development of special saving
accounts, such as Individual Retirement Accounts, 401(k) plans, and Keogh plans. These
voluntary accounts, which we refer to as “saving incentives, ” feature preferential tax treatment
of contributions and investment earnings; annual contribution limits; and penalties for early
withdrawals.
The question addressed in this paper is the extent to which saving incentives have raised
private and national (public plus private) saving. Contributions and investment earnings are
typically tax-deferred, thus reducing public saving (increasing the budget deficit) in the short
run. The long-run impact on public saving is less obvious; if the incentives increase private
saving, they may also increase income and tax revenue.
Saving incentives raise private saving when households finance contributions with
reductions in consumption or increases in labor supply. Private saving rises even if the
contributions are financed by the associated tax cut; this reinforces the importance of
examining the net impact on public and private saving. Saving incentives do not raise private
saving when households finance contributions with reductions in existing assets, with saving
that would have been done even in the absence of the incentive, or with increases in debt. It is
also possible that the higher after-tax return on saving incentives could reduce private saving.
For example, target saving occurs when people follow the common financial planning
technique of saving enough to replace a fixed percentage of their pre-retirement income in
1retirement (Doyle and Johnson 1991). Higher returns reduce the amount of saving needed to
reach a given target. Even for life-cycle savers, the higher after-tax return on saving incentives
yields ambiguous effects on saving due to opposing income and substitution effects.
In recent years, a number of studies have examined the effects of saving incentives and
reached a variety of conclusions. The crucial issue in this literature is determining what
households who have (or are eligible for) saving incentive accounts would have saved in the
absence of these incentives. Several factors, however, make this a difficult problem and one
subject to a series of biases that generally overstate the impact of saving incentives on saving.
First, saving behavior varies significantly across households. Householcls that participate
in, or are eligible for, saving incentive plans have systematically stronger tastes for saving than
other households. Thus, a simple comparison of the saving behavior of households with and
without saving incentives will be biased in favor of showing that the incentives raise saving.
Second, saving and wealth are net concepts: If a household borrows $1000 and puts the
money in a saving incentive account, net private saving is zero. The data indicate that
households with saving incentives have taken on more debt than other households. Hence,
studies should focus on how saving incentives affect wealth (assetsminus debt), not just assets.
Because financial assets are small relative to total assets, studies that focus only on the effects of
saving incentives on financial assets may have particularly limited significance.
Third, since the expansion of IRAs and 401(k)s in the early 1980s, financial markets,
pensions, and Social Security have undergone major changes. omitting interactions among
these changes and saving incentives can overstate the effects of the incentives on saving.
Fourth, saving incentive contributions are generally taxdeductible and saving incentive
accounts represent pre-tax balances; one cannot consume the entire amount because taxes and
2perhaps penalties are due upon withdrawal. In contrast, contributions to other accounts are
generally not deductible and one may generally consume the entire balance in a taxable
account. 1 Therefore, a given balance in a saving incentive account represents less saving
(defined either as reduced previous consumption or increased future consumption) than an
equivalent amount in a conventional account.
effects
Fifth, saving incentives that are part of a worker’s total compensation can have different
than other plans. All else equal, a worker that has a 401(k) with employer contributions
has higher total compensation than a worker with the same cash wage that does not have a
401(k) and would be expected to have higher saving as well. Ignoring the distinction between
total compensation and cash wages can lead to a systematic overstatement of the impact of
401(k)s on saving.
A major theme of this paper is that analyses that ignore these issues-including most
previous research efforts in this area-overstate the impact of saving incentives on saving. We
show that accounting for these factors largely or completely eliminates the estimated positive
impact of saving incentives on saving found in the literature. Thus, we conclude that little if
any of the overall contributions to existing saving incentives have raised private or national
saving. Our conclusion does not rule out the possibility that existing saving incentives have
raised saving for some individuals, or
do we rule out that saving incentives
that saving incentives may eventually raise saving. Nor
in different forms might raise saving.
The next section sets the stage by describing the main features of existing programs and
‘The major exception applies to the portion of asset value that represents capital gains,
which are taxed when the asset is sold. But estimates by Kennickell and Wilcox (1992) imply
that unrealized capital gains accounted for only about 10 percent of the value of all household
financial assetsheld outside of retirement accounts in 1989.
3examining aggregate trends in U.S. saving and saving incentives. We then organize our
comments around the various types of data and methods that have been used to examine these
issues, including cross-sectional studies of IRAs and 401&)s; studies using cohort analysis,
successive cross-sections, and panel data. In each case, our goal is to use the five considerations
listed above to reconcile estimates suggesting that saving incentives raise saving with our own
results and conclusion that the incentives have not raised saving. The remainder of the paper
addresses related issues. These include substitution between 401(k)s and pensions at the firm
level; results from simulation models; the effects on public revenues; the effects of saving
incentives in Canada; and the application of psychological models to understand saving
incentives. The conclusion discusses some of the broader ramifications of our findings. We use
two appendices to respond to criticisms by others concerning our previous work.
(11) Background
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were established in 1974 for workers without
pensions and allowed taxdeductible contributions up to an annual limit. In 1981, eligibility
was extended to all workers and the limits were raised to their current levels. For a single
worker, the limit is the minimum of earnings or $2000. The presence of a non-working spouse
raises the limit by $250. The limit in a two-worker household is the minimum of earnings or
$2000 for each worker, for a maximum combined limit of $4000. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) restricted IRA deductibility. For households with a retirement plan, deductibility is
phased out (eliminated) when adjusted gross income exceeds $40,000 ($50,000) for joint tax-
filers, and $25,000 ($35,000) for single tax-filers. TRA86 did not restrict IRA eligibility or the
tax-free accrual of interest. Deductible contributions are taxed when withdrawn, while non-
deductible contributions are not. In either case, returns on contributions are untaxed until
4withdrawn. Withdrawals are subject to income tax and, if the account holder is younger than
59.5, an additional 10 percent penalty.
Although established in 1978, 401(k)s were not generally used until regulations
clarifying their tax treatment were issued in 1981. Like IRAs, 401(k)s feature tax-deductible
contributions, tax-free accrual of interest, annual contribution limits, and restrictions on
withdrawals. But the accounts differ in several respects. 401(k)s are available only to
employees of organizations that choose to sponsor the plans.2 Contributions to 401@)s are
typically made via regular payroll deductions, while IRA contributions can be made on an
irregular basis. Employers’ 401(k) contributions are taxdeductible and may depend on the
level of employee contributions. Most employees offered 401(k)s are also offered employer
contributions.3 The IRS limit on annual employee contributions is $9,500 in 1996, but many
workers face lower limits due to nondiscrimination rules or rules set by the employer.
Borrowing against the existing 401(k) balance is allowed in most plans, as are withdrawals due
to hardship conditions.
Keogh plans and simplified employee pensions are similar to IRAs but have higher
limits and apply to the self-employed and employees of small business.
‘Strictly speaking, section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes plans only for
employees of for-profit firms. Sections 403(b) and 457 authorize salary-reduction plans for
employees of non-profit institutions and state and local governments, respectively. Federal
government employees may participate in thrift saving plans. All of these plans are similar to
401(k) plans, and we refer to them collectively as 401&) plans.
3Using data from the 1993 Current Population Survey, Survey of Employee Benefits,
Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1996) find that among workers offered a 401(k) plan, 72.9
percent were offered a positive employer match, with a mean match rate of 62.3 percent among
those with positive match rates.
5(111) A~zrezate Trends in Savinz Incentives and Personal Saving
Figure 1 compares overall contributions to saving incentives and personal saving in
recent years.4 As measured in the National Income and Product Accounts, personal saving is
the difference between personal disposable income and personal spending. Major changes in
the ratio of saving incentive contributions to GDP occurred only twice. From 1981 to 1982,
with the expansion of IRAs and the issuance of clarifying regulations on 401(k)s, saving
incentive contributions rose by almost a full percentage point of GDP, but the personal saving
rate was flat. Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, both saving incentive contributions and
personal saving fell. The coincident fall from 1986 to 1987 may be suggestive of a causal
relation, but personal saving had been declining since 1984, and it fell in 1987 by almost twice
as much as saving incentive contributions did. In addition, the amount of saving that occurs in
saving incentives includes interest and dividend earnings, plus rollovers, less withdrawals and
hence is larger than the contributions alone.5 Accounting for these factors, saving in saving
incentives declined by only $5 billion from 1986 to 1987, while personal saving fell by $28
billion. Thus, saving incentives accounted for only a small part of the fall in personal saving
from 1986 to 1987.
4The composition of saving incentive contributions has changed over time. IRA
contributions totalled $5 billion in 1981, rising to $34 billion annually from 1982 to 1986,
following the rule changes in 1981. After the 1986 tm act restricted IRA deductions,
contributions fell to $20 billion in 1987 and $16 billion in 1990 (EBRI 1995). Keogh
contributions rose over the 1980s but have remained below $9 billion per year (Statistics of
Income, various years). Contributions to 401(k) plans grew steadily from $16 billion in 1984 to
$64 billion in 1992 (Department of Labor, 1996).
5This saving me~ure is the same as the change in overall balances in saving incentive
accounts, less capital gains. Capital gains are excluded because they are also excluded from
personal saving and national income. The calculations required to make these estimates allocate
IRA and 401(k) balances to stocks and other assets using the percentages described in Hubbard
and Skinner (1995).
6Taking the 1980-92 period as a whole, contributions to saving incentives rose by 1.1
percent of GDP, and the broader measure of saving in saving incentive accounts rose by almost
2 percent of GDP but personal saving declined.G None of these patterns provides any evidence
that saving incentives influence the level of personal saving.’
The aggregate impact of saving incentives would be uninteresting if they were a tiny
fraction of total saving. But from 1982 to 1994, the incentives accounted for one-third or more
of personal saving. If these plans represent mostly new saving, it would not be unreasonable to
expect saving of this magnitude to raise personal saving or at least to expect sharp increases in
saving incentive contributions to be reflected in the aggregate statistics. But that is not what
the data show. It remains possible, however, that saving would have fallen even further if the
incentives had not been enacted. For this and other reasons, research has turned to
macroeconomic data.
(IV) Cross-sectional evidence on IRAs
Confronting the heterogeneity in underlying saving behavior between contributors and
non-contributors is crucial to understanding IRAs. For example, a commonly made claim in
favor of the idea that IRAs raise saving is that the typical household holds few financial assets
and thus IRA contributions must be largely new saving rather than a reallocation of existing
assets (Feldstein and Feenberg 1983; Venti and Wise 1991). This claim is misleading, however,
since the typical household does not have an IRA. The extent to which IRAs raise private
GThese patterns are similar if one uses alternate measures of personal saving, like the Flow
of Funds measure or the Flow of Funds calculated on a NIPA basis.
‘As noted above, the effect of saving incentives on national saving is of most interest. But if
there is no impact on personal saving, the effect on national saving will be worse at least in the
short run. National saving has fallen since 1982, due to generally higher federal budget deficits
and reduced private saving.
7saving hinges on the behavior of households that contribute to ~As, not of those that do not.
And if the question is the effects of raising the annual contribution limit, as it is in the formal
econometric models described below, analysis should focus on households that contribute to
the limit.
Contributors that view IRAs as good substitutes for taxable assets are more likely to
transfer into IRAs existing xsets or saving that would have been done anyway. These transfers
provide a tax break for doing what the household would have done and will not raise private
saving. Contributors who view IRAs as poor substitutes for other assetswill fund
contributions by reducing consumption (raising saving). From 1983 to 1985, almost 70 percent
of IRA contributions were made by households with heads older than 59 or with 1986 non-
IRA financial assets in excess of $20,000. About 78 percent of households that contributed to
the limit in each of the three years were in these groups (Gale and Scholz 1994). For these
households, IRAs are likely to be good substitutes for other saving. Households older than 59
face no penalty on IRA withdrawals and those with large amounts of other assets can avoid
penalties by consuming other assets first. Thus, for most contributors, the effects of IRAs on
saving seem likely to be small at best.
In 1983, the median IRA contributor held $77,ooo in net worth, excluding pensions,
and $16,000 in non-IRA financial assets, while the median household that contributed to the
limit for each year from 1983 to 1985 held $101,000 in net worth and $30,000 in non-IRA
financial assets. These figures indicate substantial opportunity at the beginning of the IRA
program for contributors to shift existing assets into IRAs and contrast sharply with median
8wealth of $20,448 and total financial assets of $2,050 for households without IRAs.8
Some of this heterogeneity in saving is due to observable factors such as age, earnings,
or family size. But even after controlling for such factors, there is substantial heterogeneity in
unobserved tastes or influences on saving (Diamond and Hausman 1984).9 Allowing for
heterogeneity while estimating the effects of IRAs has proven difficult. For example, Hubbard
(1984) estimates that households with IRAs have higher ratios of net worth to income than do
other households, but his estimates do not allow for differences in tastes for saving across the
two groups, so the results are difficult to interpret.
Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991) estimate that raising the annual contribution
limit would raise IRA saving and that 45 to 66 percent of the increased contributions would
come from reductions in consumption.l” However, these estimates are based on the
identifying assumption that in the absence of IRAs, households that contributed the limit
amount would have saved the same amount as households that did not contribute to IRAs.
Thus, to generate substitution between IRAs and other saving, limit contributors would need
to have less non-IRA saving than non-contributors, controlling for household characteristics.
*The figures in this paragraph are based on tabulations of the 1983 Sumey of Consumer
Finances.
Tor example, households with different discount rates would adjust their saving differently
to a one dollar increase in initial wealth (Gale and Scholz 1994).
1°Between 3 and 20 percent of the increased contributions would be financed by reductions
in other saving and about 35 percent would come from reduced tax payments. Some features
of the Venti-Wise framework are worth noting. For example, consumers are assumed to
maximize a function that has IRA saving and other saving as specific arguments. It is unclear
what sort of utility function or preferences would correspond to such a decision function.
Also, Venti and Wise restrict the fraction of IRAs that are new saving to be between zero and
one, although there is no theoretical justification for doing so. This restriction rules out the
possibility that households are target savers and even that income effects of IRAs are larger
than the substitution effects. For details and other discussion, see Gale and Scholz (1994).
9The identifying assumption, of course, is not valid if contributors have stronger tastes for
saving than non-contributors, as is now widely understood to be the case (see the discussion in
Appendix A). Thus, the Venti and Wise model interprets findings that limit contributors saved
more than non-contributors m evidence that IRAs raise saving, even though that finding is
perfectly consistent with the view that limit contributors have higher tastes for saving and
IRAs do not raise saving. In short, the identifying assumption biases the results toward finding
that IRAs raise saving even if they do not. 11
Gale and Scholz (1994) develop and estimate a model that addresses these and other
concerns. They assume that households maximize a utility function that depends on current
and expected future consumption. Individuals like the higher return on IRAs relative to other
saving, but face uncertain income and are hesitant to lock up funds in an IRA. Thus, IRAs are
imperfect substitutes for other saving, but as assets and age rise, IRAs become better substitutes
because the withdrawal penalty becomes less important. They assume a quadratic utility
function, which allows derivation of a specific, estimable saving function.
The model implies that, in the absence of IRAs, households who contributed to the
limit in each of three years would have saved the same as other IRA contributors, rather than
non-contributors .lz Thus, the model allows for differences in saving between contributors and
llThe bias can also be seen by noting that for IRAs to be a perfect substitute for other
saving in the Venti-Wise model, every household that saved any amount would have to hold an
IRA. Since only about 20 percent of the sample held IRAs, it is not surprising that Venti and
Wise reject the hypothesis of perfect substitutability for the whole sample. However, what
matters is whether IRA contributors–not every household that saves–find IRAs to be good
substitutes for IRAs. As noted in the text, most contributors and limit contributors may find
IRAs to be good substitutes for taxable saving.
12Thisassumption is consistent with the data. See Appendix A.
10non-co ntributors.13 The model also allows the substitutability between IRAs and other saving
to depend on household characteristics.
The model is estimated on households from the 1983-1986 Surveys of Consumer
Finances (SCF). The estimates generate reasonable saving functions and show that people with
higher assetsfind IRAs and other saving to be better substitutes. Hence, for these people, IRA
contributions are less likely to represent new saving. The estimates suggest that increases in the
IRA contribution limit in 1983-86 would have generated little if any new saving. The central
estimate is that 2 percent of the additional contributions would have represented net additions
to national saving if the reduction in tax payments due to incre~ed deductions had been
completely saved. If some of the tax cut had been spent, the effect on national saving would
have been even smaller or negative.
Gale and Scholz also test and reject the idea that contributors and noncontributory have
similar non-IRA saving equations. Thus, it is not valid in the context of their model to impose
the same non-IRA saving equation for contributors and noncontributory or to assume that in
the absence of IRAs contributors and non-contributors would have saved the same amount.
In Appendix A, we briefly describe the Gale and Scholz (1994) model and address
criticisms of the model raised by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) and Bernheim (1996).14
‘3As noted by Hubbard and Skinner (1995), allowing the saving equations to differ across
contributors and non-contributors represents a crucial difference with the Venti-Wise approach
and makes the Gale-Scholz model more general than the Venti-Wise model.
14Gravelle(1991) and Skinner (1992) provide surveys of the literature on IRAs. Attanasio
and De Leire (1994) present additional evidence on IRAS, which they interpret as being
consistent with the Gale and Scholz (1994) results. This interpretation has been challenged by
Hubbard and Skinner (1995) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996).
11(w Cross-sectional evidence on 401&)s: Is 401(k) Eli~ibility Exozenous?
From an analytical perspective, a potentially advantageous aspect of 401(k) plans is that,
unlike IRAs, they are not universally available. If 401(k) eligibility were distributed
independently of underlying propensities to save, the effects of 401(k)s could be measured from
simple comparisons of the saving or wealth of eligible and ineligible households. However, if
eligibility is positively correlated with underlying tastes for saving, then cross-sectional
comparisons of eligibles and ineligibles that do not control for t~tes for saving will
systematically overstate the effects of 401(k)s on saving.
At first glance, the idea that 401(k) eligibility is exogenous may seem plausible; as
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995, p. 10) note, “eligibility y is determined by employers. ” But
while employers ultimately decide on the policy, a relevant issue is whether employers take
employee preferences into account. In a survey of a broad range of employers, “perceived
employee interest” was
plan and was noted by
be surprising; it would
the second-most frequently stated reason that a firm installed a 401(k)
63.5 percent of respondents (Buck Consultants, 1989). This should not
be strange if employers created benefits without regard to employee
preferences. Moreover, even if firms did provide 401(k)s randomly, we would expect workers
with high tastes for saving to seek out firms with 401(k)s or to encourage their firms to provide
401(k)s. These patterns would be consistent with theoretical and empirical models of
pensions .15 But if employers do consider employee preferences, or if some employees prefer
firms that offer 401(k)s, then eligibility is likely to be positively correlated with tastes for
151ppolito (1993) explains the growth of 401(k)s precisely in terms of their ability to help
firms attract and retain workers with higher tastes for saving.
Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1993), Curme and Even (1995),
(1993).
For related empirical work, see
Johnson (1993), and Ippolito
12saving.
Ultimately, whether 401(k) eligibility is exogenous is an empirical issue. Poterba, Venti,
and Wise (1995) present regressions showing that eligible households have about the same level
of non-pension, non-401(k) financial resets as ineligible households, controlling for income and
other factors. They interpret these results as evidence that 401(k) eligibility is exogenous with
respect to tastes for saving.
But the evidence and interpretation are at best fragile. Bernheim (1994a, 1996) shows
that evidence in Poterba, Venti, and Wise’s own work indicates that differences in median
financial assets between eligible and ineligible households are, in several income classes, several
times as large as median 401(k) balances for eligible households. Bernheim and Garrett (1995),
using cross section data, find that 401@) eligibility “raises” total wealth by about four times as
much as it “raises” retirement wealth. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, Table 8) use a similar
sample from the same data set as Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995), a slightly different test format
and a longer list of explanatory variables, and find that eligible families have higher levels of
non-pension, non~Ol (k) financial resets, net financial assets and net worth. Unless 401(k)
contributions crowd in several times their value in non~Ol ~) saving, each of these findings
suggest that eligibility is positively correlated with tastes for saving.
A second problem is that Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) omit pensions. Families
eligible for 401(k)s are between 24 and 33 percentage points more likely to be covered by a
defined benefit pension plan than other families, controlling for other factors (Engen, Gale, and
Scholz, 1994). Again, this implies that eligible households have higher non~Ol(k) wealth than
ineligible households. Moreover, if pension coverage is positively correlated with tastes for
saving (see footnote 15), then the difference in coverage is further evidence that 401(k)
13eligibility is not exogenous. Even if pension coverage is independent of tastes for saving, the
higher pension wealth should show up as lower levels of non-pension wealth for eligibles than
ineligibles if any of the pension wealth is offset by reductions in non-pension wealth. In short,
the findings on pensions imply that to believe that 401(k) eligibility is exogenous requires
additional assumptions that (a) pension coverage is not correlated with tastes for saving, and (b)
all pension wealth is new wealth.
The Poterba, Venti, and Wise test has another problem that creates a potentially large
bias in favor of finding that eligibility is exogenous: the test ignores all 401(k) wealth and
thereby assumes that all 401(k) saving is new saving. To determine whether 401(k) eligibility is
exogenous requires knowing whether eligible families would have saved more than ineligible
families in the absence of 401(k)s. If x percent of 401(k) wealth would have existed anyway, an
appropriate test of erogeneity compares the nonAOl(k) assets of ineligible families to the sum
of non401 (k) assetsplus x percent of the 401(k) wealth of eligible families. Clearly, assuming
that all 401(k) saving is new saving (x= O)–asin the Poterba, Venti and Wise test–creates a bias
in favor of finding that eligibility is exogenous.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that eligibility is positively correlated with tastes
for saving and that comparisons of eligible and ineligible households that do not control for
tastes for saving are biased toward showing that 401(k)s raise saving.
Bernheim and Garrett (1995) take a different approach to this problem.lA They use a
cross-section of households and estimate the impact of 401(k) eligibility on self-reported
lAThemain purpose of the Bernheim-Garrett study is to examine the effects of financial
education on saving, but the regressions also contain estimates of the impact of 401(k) eligibility
on saving.
14household saving rates, conditioning on initial wealth and other factors,17 If initial wealth
adequately controls for tastes for saving, this procedure may help identify the effects of 401(k)s
on saving. Bernheim and Garrett (1995) find that 401(k) eligibility y raises self-reported saving
rates by 1.5 percentage points. When placed in context, we believe this result supports the
finding that only a small portion of 401(k) contributions represent new saving.
The typical 401(k) eligible worker appears to give at least 5 percent of salary to his
401(k).ls Thus, at most 30 percent (1.5/5) of 401(k) contributions might be new saving. But
about 20 percent or more of the contributions represent tax deductions rather than saving, so
the impact on saving rates should be reduced by about 1 percentage point (2o percent of 5
percent), leaving an increase in saving of 0.5 percentage points, suggesting that only 10 percent
of 401(k) contributions represent new saving.
Even this estimate, however, overstates the effect on saving; another problem is that the
regressions in Bernheim and Garrett (1995) (as well as those in Poterba, Venti and Wise 1995)
overstate the impact of 401(k)s because they control for cash earnings rather than total
compensation. Employer contributions are a part of total compensation, but not cash earnings.
Thus, if two households have the same cash earnings and one has a 401(k) with employer
contributions, the latter has higher total compensation and will have higher overall saving even
17Thespecification differs from PVW in that Bernheim and Garrett use a saving rate
measure rather than wealth as the dependent variable, and control for wealth as an explanatory
variable.
lgThe average employee contribution among participating workers is 7 percent or more of
salary. More than 70 percent of those offered 401(k)s also receive employer contributions, with
an average matching rate of over 60 percent. Thus, the combined contribution for the average
contributor is likely to be in the range of 10-11 percent of salary. Since about two-thirds or
more of eligible workers contribute to 401(k)s, a reasonable estimate for the combined
contributions of a typical eligible worker would be at lemt 5 percent of salary. See, for
example, EBRI 1994, Table 8; and Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1996).
15if 401 (k)s are fully offset by reductions in other saving. If the regression controls for cash
earnings, but not for employer 401(k) contributions, the coefficient on 401(k) eligibility y will
pick up any offset between 401(k)s and other saving–which should produce a zero or negative
coefficient–but will also pick up an income or wealth effect associated with the 401(k) -eligible
household having higher total compensation and higher saving–which would tend to produce a
positive coefficient. Therefore, the coefficient on 401(k) eligibility will overstate the impact of
401(k)s on saving if the regression controls for cash earnings but not total compensation. This
bias is described in more detail in Appendix B below and in Gale (1995). Thus, we interpret
the Bernheim-Garrett results as showing that less than 10 percent of 401(k) contributions
represent net additions to saving.]9
Cohort analysis
A cohort is a group of people born within a given time interval. Table 1 reports results
from cohort analyses in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) and Venti and Wise (1996). Mean
financial assets for families aged 60-64 in 1991 were about $8,200 higher than for families aged
60-64 in 1984. Mean saving incentive balances were $9,000 higher. Median financial assetsfor
families aged 60-64 with saving incentives in
aged families with saving incentives in 1984.
1991 were about $15,000
Median saving incentive
higher than for similarly
balances were about
190ne caveat to this conclusion is that the dependent variable measures saving out of family
income, while the 401&) contributions variable ii measured in our example as a ~roportion of-
the worker’s earnings, which are less than family income. But 26 percent of the Bernheim-
Garrett sample is single and many married couples have only one earner, so it is unclear
whether the bias is very large. Assuming that half of the households have one earner, typical
contributions would be about 3.75 percent of family income for eligible households (5 percent
for single earners, and 2.5 percent for an earner in a dual earner couple), and about 0.75 percent
(=20 percent of 3.75 percent) of salary would represent deferred taxes, rather than saving.
Hence, the proportion of 401(k) contributions that would represent new saving would be (1,5-
.75)/3 .75 = 20 percent. Even this would be an overstatement, though, due to use of cash
wages rather than total compensation in the regressions.
16$14,000 higher. For families without saving incentives, median financial assetsfell slightly.
Venti and Wise (1996, p. 11-12) interpret the results as showing that saving incentives
have raised private saving: “The basic assumption is that younger cohorts-that reached a given
age in later calendar years–had a longer period in which to contribute to personal retirement
accounts. But that in other respects the cohorts are similar (after correcting for earnings...).
Thus differences in asset accumulation can be attributed to the differential availability of these
pro grams.” Our view, however, is that accounting for other developments in the 1980s and for
data problems in the analysis leaves essentially no room for saving incentives to have raised
wealth.20
A fundamental problem with cohort analysis is that it is impossible to identify separate
age, time, and cohort effects without strong and unverifiable assumptions. Cohort effects apply
to specific groups born in a common period. Time effects apply to all groups at a given point
in time. Age effects refer to the behavior of people at different points of the life cycle.
Identification problems arise because age equals time minus cohort, so the three variables
provide only two pieces of information. Thus, “cohort analyses” are more appropriately
thought of as an unknown combination of age, time, and cohort effects.
For example, consider the claim by Venti and Wise (1996) that, other than increased
exposure to 401(k)s and IRAs, there were no systematic differences between the cohort aged 60-
64 in 1984 and the one aged 60-64 in 1991 that would have affected accumulation of financial
assets. It is implausible to attribute all or even most of the growth in financial assets to saving
incentives: between 1984 and 1991, aggregate real financial assetsgrew by $4 trillion, while
2oVenti and Wise (1996) present findings similar to those in table 1 for several other
cohorts. These results are subject to criticisms of the same nature as those noted in the text.
17saving incentive balances grew by less than $1 trillion.21 Several major changes occurred
during this period, each of which suggests that financial assetswould have risen in the 1980s,
independent of saving incentives. None of these factors are controlled for in the Venti and
Wise analysis, but taken together, they can explain virtually all of the increase in assetsshown
in table 1.
We consider first the mean results in the top panel. The most obvious reason for the
growth in financial assets was the stock market boom. From 1984 to 1991, the S&P 500 Index
rose by 78 percent in real terms. In contrast, from 1977 to 1984, the real index fell by 5
percent. This difference alone can explain most of the difference in financial assets.n In
addition, real interest rates were higher between 1984 and 1991 than in the preceding several
21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, selected years; Employee Benefits
Research Institute, 1995.
‘Calculations using the SIPP show that the cohort aged 60-64 in 1991 had mean stock and
mutual fund holdings outside of retirement accounts in 1984 of $6,200 (1991 dollars). Mean
1984 IRA and Keogh balances were $3,800, of which we estimate (based on EBRI data) about
$950 was held in stocks and mutual funds, so that total mean stock and mutual fund holdings
were $7,150. A passive investment strategy that held the S&P 500 index would have raised
these initial holdings to $12,727 (=$7,150*1.78) in 1991. If the 1991 cohort had instead faced
the 5 percent drop in the S&P experienced by the 1984 cohort between 1977 and 1984, the
$7,150 would have fallen to $6,8oo. Thus, differences in stock market returns can account for a
wealth difference of $5,927 (= $12,727- $6,800), or about 72 percent of the entire $8,169
increase documented in table 1. These calculations, however, understate the importance of the
stock market boom because the SIPP data used here and by Venti and Wise omit balances held
in 401(k)s and thrifts in 1984. Estimates from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances show
that average thrift balances for 53-57 year olds in 1983 were twice as large as average IRA and
Keogh balances. This suggests adding an additional $1,900 to mean stock and mutual fund
holdings of 53-57 year olds in 1984. Making this adjustment and redoing the calculations above
with $9,050 rather than $7,150 in 1984 holdings for 53-57 year olds implies that differences in
stock market performance can account for over $7,5oo, or about 92 percent, of the increase in
mean financial assetsshown in the top panel of table 1.
18years.23 Thus, the 1991 cohort of 60-64 year olds experienced higher returns on their pre-
existing financial assets than the 1984 cohort did in the seven years prior to observation in the
data.
Changes in four other components of wealth also fueled the increase in financial assets
in 1980s. Considering these changes is important because financial assets are only a small part
of wealth. In 1991, for example, mean financial assets were only 17 percent of mean net worth
for 65-69 year olds and median financial assets were only 5 percent of median net worth
(Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1994).
First, the 1980s saw a substantial decline in inflation and marginal tax rates. As a result,
investors shifted away from tangible capital (like housing) that was more attractive in the 1970s
(Feldstein 1980, Summers 1981 and Poterba 1984). Hence, part of the increase in financial
assets was just a shift in the composition of assets. Second, mortgages and overall household
debt rose relative to income or assets. At least a quarter of the rise in financial assets from
1984 to 1991 was matched by an increase in debt (Board of Governors). Third, the value of
social security benefits were reduced in the 1983 reforms. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994)
estimate that for households aged 65-69 in 1991, real mean and median social security wealth
was about $6,000 lower than for households aged 65-69 in 1984. Fourth, pension coverage
(other than 401(k)s) also fell in the 1980s. Calculations using the SIPP indicate that 55.4
percent of working households aged 60-64 were covered by a defined benefit or non-401(k)
defined contribution plan in 1984 compared to 46.9 percent of 60-64 year olds in 1991. These
23The nominal return on three month Treasury bills less the increase in the consumer price
index averaged 2.41 percent between 1977 and 1984 and 3.24 percent between 1984 and 1991.
The corresponding figures for AAA-rated corporate bonds are 4.17 percent and 6.11 percent,
respectively (Economic Report of the President, 1996).
19declines in social security and pensions could have induced an increase in financial assets.24
A number of data problems also create biases. First, saving incentives contributions are tax-
deductible and the withdrawals are taxed; hence, the reported balance is a pre-tax amount.
Other saving is treated in the opposite manner, and the balances in such accounts represent
post-tax amounts other than the portion of asset value that represents capital gains. Saving can
be thought of as either reduced previous consumption or increased future consumption. In
either case, the extra $9,OOOheld in saving incentive balances by the 1991 cohort does M
represent $9,OOOof increased saving. Since the contribution is deductible, previous
consumption would have fallen by at most only (l-t) * $9000, where t is the combined
marginal federal and state tax rate. Because the withdrawal is fully taxed, future consumption
has increased by only (1-t) * $9000. Of course, realized capital gains from taxable accounts are
also subject to tax. But Kennickell and Wilcox (1992) estimate that capital gains represented
only one-third of the asset value of stocks and mutual funds outside of retirement accounts in
1989. This represents only about 10 percent of the value of total household financial assets
outside of retirement accounts in 1989.
Estimating the appropriate “t” requires combining several factors. The average marginal
federal tax rate for IRA participants from 1979-88 was 22 percent.25 Adding in a measure of
state tax rates and accounting for the small proportion of taxable financial assets facing capital
24SeeBernheim (1987) and citations therein on the effects of social security on saving. Gale
(1995) reviews the literature on how pensions affect saving and provides new estimates.
25Thisfigure is based on estimates from 1979-88 using the IRS-Michigan tax panel, as
reported in Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994). Characteristics that help determine effective tax
rates, such as income, family size, home ownership, are roughly similar between 401(k)
participants and IRA participants. Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, and 1991) estimate a
marginal tax rate of about 35 percent for IRA holders in 1982-6.
20gains taxes, we conclude that t= 20 percent is, if anything, a very conservative estimate of the
difference in effective tax ratesTG If so, then at least $1,800 of the $9,OOOincrease in tax-
preferred assetsdoes not represent saving.
A second data problem is that the SIPP data contain no information on balances in
401@)s in 1984 or in after-tax thrift plans in any year. Thrifts were prevalent before 401@)s
became popular, and a substantial portion of 401(k)s appear to have been converted from thrift
plans over the course of the 1980s. As these conversions occurred, they appeared in the SIPP
as 401(k) balances in 1987 and 1991 even though their equivalent balance as thrift plans did not
appear in 1984 or in later years. Thus, omitting after-tax thrift plans in all years and 401(k)s in
1984 understates 1984 wealth and overstates the increase in
from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances indicates that
entire cohort aged 60-64 in 1983 was $5,860 (1991 dollars).
wealth from 1984 to 1991. Data
mean balances in thrifts for the
Although caution is warranted in
comparing data from different sources, almost all of the $8,200 increase in mean financial assets
in the top panel can be explained by the data problems alone.
The same issues arise in understanding why median financial assets of saving incentive
participants rose relative to nonparticipants over this period, as shown in the bottom panel.
First consider the data problems. The $14,000 rise in median saving incentive balances shown
in the bottom panel of table 1 is overstated by $2,800 if a tax rate of 20 percent is assumed.
The omission of thrift plans appears especially important. Among households aged 60-64 with
an IRA or thrift in the 1983 SCF, including thrift balances raised median total financial assets
2AHubbard and Skinner (1995) assume that saving incentive balances will be taxed at a 25
percent rate when withdrawn and describe that figure as likely to be an underestimate of the
true rate. Using that estimate, if 10 percent of financial assets are subject to capital gains
taxation at a rate of 30 percent, for an effective rate of 3 percent on all financial assets, then the
appropriate rate at which to adjust saving incentive balances would be 22 (= 25-3) percent.
21by $8,519 in 1991 dollars. The omission of 401(k)s from the 1984 data further reduces
measured 1984 wealth of participants relative to non-participants and leads to an overstatement
of the increase in relative wealth holdings of participants from 1984 to 1991. Thus, these data
issues alone can explain a large proportion of the increase in financial assetsfor participants
relative to non-participants.
In addition, the stock market boom and high real interest rates raised financial assets
more in arithmetic terms for participants than for non-participants because participants in 1984
had many times more financial assets than non-participants.z’ Moreover, debt increased more
rapidly for 401(k) and IRA participants than for non-participants (see Engen, Gale, and Scholz
1994, Engen and Gale 1995) but debt holdings are omitted from the table.2g
Thus, we find little evidence in “cohort” analyses that saving incentives raise wealth. It
is plausible to attribute virtually all of the reported increase in financial assets to the stock
market boom, the rise in real interest rates, the role of shifts in non-financial assets, debt,
*’Among households that were 53-57 years old in the 1984 (the cohort that was 60-64 in
1991), median financial assets were $23,000 among saving incentive participants but only $1,200
for non-participants. @hese figures do not control for household characteristics and so are not
directly comparable to the figures in table 1.) If the stock market boom and the rise in real
interest rates raised annual rates of return by 3 percentage points between 1984 and 1991 as
compared to the period between 1977 and 1984, this would have caused initial balances to rise
by over $5,000 for the median saving incentive participant from 1984 to 1991, but by only $3OO
for the median non-participant. Thus, higher rates of return in the 1984-91 period translate
mechanically into larger differences in wealth between 60-64 year old participants and
nonparticipants in 1991 as compared to 1984.
**The shift from non-financial assets to financial assets caused by falling inflation and
marginal tax rates likely also caused an increase in the financial assets of saving incentive
participants relative to non-participants. If participants and nonparticipants shifted the same
proportion of their portfolio to financial assets, this would generate a larger arithmetic
in financial assetsfor participants, because their initial wealth level was much larger.
Moreover, participants may have shifted a greater percentage to financial assets because
had greater access to financial assets that are tax-preferred.
increase
they
22pensions and social security, and data problems.
(VII) Evidence from Successive Cross-sectional Studies
Successive cross-sectional studies use random cross-sections of households from two or
more years. Households eligible for 401(k)s in later years had access to 401(k)s for longer, on
average, than eligible households in earlier years. Other things equal, if 401(k)s raise wealth,
the wealth of cross-sections
of eligible or “like” families
same problems.29
of eligible households should increase over time. This comparison
over time is very similar to cohort analysis and suffers from the
Nevertheless, Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996, p. 27) emphasize that “the critical feature
of our approach to controlling for heterogeneity is comparison of the within proup chan~e in
non-IRA401 @) assets as IRA and or 401(k) assets grow... ” (emphasis in the original). While
much of the research reported in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) adopts this approach, it is
difficult to learn anything from within group comparisons of eligible (or “like”) families over
time. Within group comparisons never explicitly confront the critical issue in this literature:
namely, establishing what households would have done in the absence of saving incentives.
The implicit assumption is that other financial assets would have stayed the same, so papers
typically show that other financial assets do not fall over time a saving incentive balances rise
and conclude that saving incentives are largely new saving. But the implicit assumption that
other financial reset balances for these households would not have grown in the absence of
saving incentives is extreme, because of the stock market boom, high real interest rates, the rise
in debt, the shift away from non-financial assets due to falling inflation and tax rates, and the
2’For example, the second panel of table 1 compares 60-64 year old participants in 1984 and
1991, while the test using eligible families described in the text would compare 25-64 year old
eligible families in 1984 with 25-64 year old eligible families in 1991.
23decline in pensions and social security over the period being studied.
A cleaner test relies on the intuition that if 401(k)s increase wealth, wealth should rise
more over time for cross-sections of eligible households than for ineligible households. Even
this comparison across groups
problems of cohort analysis.30
and time, however, shares many of the same features and
A key assumption is that, over time, changes in the level or
composition of wealth for eligible households relative to ineligible households were due only to
lengthier access to saving incentive plans.
A recent example of successive cross-section analysis is Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995),
who find that from 1987 to 1991 median financial assets rose by about $2,900 (in 1987 dollars)
for eligible households relative to others, controlling for age, income, education, and marital
status. They also show that non-IRA, non401(k) financial assets did not fall for eligible
households relative to others over 1984-91. Similar results occur for comparisons of eligible
and ineligible families conditional on having an IRA. Controlling for IRA status is intended to
control for tastes for saving not captured by the other variables in the model. Poterba, Venti
and Wise conclude that most 401(k) contributions represent new saving.
As with cohort analysis, however, interpreting the results must be tempered by
consideration of changes during the 1980s (other than saving incentives) and data problems. For
example, eligible households had greater access to tax-preferred financial assets and so would
have found it more attractive to reallocate wealth to financial assets and away from
nonfinancial assetsafter the reduction in inflation and tax rates. In addition, mortgage debt
increased disproportionately for eligible households relative to ineligible households (Engen and
30The second and third panels of table 1 compare 60-64 year old saving incentive
participants and non-participants over time. Similarly, the successive cross-section test described
in the text would compare 25-64 year old eligible and ineligible households over time.
24Gale 1995). Both of these factors imply that the financial reset measure used by Poterba, Venti,
and Wise may not be a consistent measure of wealth trends over time or across groups. Data
problems are an additional concern. The SIPP data used in the study overstate the saving done
via saving incentives over time because saving incentive contributions are taxdeductible and
because thrifts and 1984 401(k) balances are omitted. All of these factors impart biases in favor
of finding that reported total financial assets rose for eligible households relative to ineligible
households even if 401(k)s did not raise wealth.
Engen and Gale (1995) address several of these issues. They use the same comparison
groups as Poterba, Venti, and Wise and a similar sample from the SIPP. They avoid using data
from 1984, due to the missing data on 401(k)s and thrifts. The major innovation of their study
is to measure the impact of 401(k) eligibility on broader measures of wealth, such as the sum of
net financial assets and home equity (called “wealth” below), as well as on narrow wealth
measures, such as financial assets.
Examining substitution between 401(k)s and housing wealth is motivated by several
considerations. First, 401(k)s and housing are both illiquid, tax-preferred assets that are often
held for long periods, so substitution would not be surprising. Second, there are many ways to
substitute between 401(k)s and housing equity. About 14 percent of eligible households had
home equity loans in 1991; about 19 percent bought new homes between 1987 and 1991; and
Bernheim (1996) estimates that about 12 percent extracted equity from their home via a
refinancing between 1987 and 1991. Thus, a substantial minority of eligible households clearly
had direct access to one of these mechanisms.
Substitution can occur in less obvious ways as well, for example, by not accelerating
mortgage payments or by not trading up into a bigger house. These channels be difficult to
25capture in survey data. Orconsider new homeowners indifferent years, who are identical
except those in later years have longer access to 401(k)s and higher 401(k) balances. Suppose
also that the later cohort has fewer liquid assets available for downpayments (because of their
higher 401(k)s). If they purchase the same size home as the earlier cohort, households in the
later cohort would take out a larger loan, and so would have less housing equity, more 401(k)
wealth, but the same overall wealth as households in the earlier cohort. Clearly, households in
the later cohort substituted 401(k)s for home equity relative to earlier cohorts, even if this
substitution was unintentional.31
Since most saving incentive participants own their home, and housing represents a
substantial portion of most households’ wealth, omitting saving that occurs in owner-occupied
housing systematically understates how much saving these households have done and makes
saving incentives appear disproportionately important in household portfolios. In addition,
because of employer matching of 401(k) contributions, financing a 401(k) with tax-deductible
mortgage borrowing can be quite lucrative.32 Finally, much of the literature on social security
and pensions examines the impact of such policies on broad measures of wealth, rather than
just financial assets. The literature indicates that looking at broader wealth definitions
31 Engen and Gale (1995) discuss other ways that unintentional substitution can occur, and
Stiglitz (1988, page 595) discusses how unintentional substitution could plausibly occur between
IRAs and home equity.
321ndeed,simple calculations show that with typical employer matching contributions,
workers should do everything possible to maximize 401(k) contributions at least up to the
match limit. Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994) report that about 75 percent of 401(k)
participants in their sample at one firm contributed at or above the match limit.
26generates larger offsets for pension wealth.33 These results are consistent with Engen and
Gale’s results.
Engen and Gale (1995) find that between 1987 and 1991, controlling for a standard list
of covariates, 401(k)-eligible households accumulated more financial assetsthan other
households. But they also show that eligible households did ~ accumulate more wealth when
housing equity is included. For renters, eligibility is estimated to have no significant effect on
holdings of financial assets. For homeowners, eligibility raises financial assets, but does not
raise the sum of net financial assets and housing equity. House value rose for eligibles relative
to others, but mortgage debt grew even faster, so that housing equity fell for eligible
homeowners relative to other homeowners. Similar results occur when the sample is stratified
by IRA status. In summary, no group of eligible families raised their wealth
equity) from 1987 to 1991 relative to the similar group of ineligible families.
(including housing
The results
suggest that any impact of 40l(k)s on financial assets is limited to homeowners, and even for
them, 401(k)s did not raise broader wealth measures. In a revised version of the paper, Engen
and Gale (1996) also show that the non+Ol(k) wealth of eligible families fell relative to
ineligible families. Finally, we note that the estimated effects on financial assets suffer from
some of the same biases as Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and so should not interpreted as
strong evidence that 401(k)s raise financial assets.
In Appendix C, we discuss additional features of the Engen and Gale results and briefly
33Avery, Elliehausen, and Gustafson (1986), Bernheim (1987), Blinder, Gordon, and Wise
(1980), Diamond and Hausman (1984), Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984), and Hubbard (1986)
estimate the impact of pensions on broad measures of wealth. Avery, Elliehausen, and
Gustafson (1986) find that only 11 percent of pension wealth shows Up as a reduction in liquid
assets, but that 66 percent of pension wealth shows up as a reduction in other net worth.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) and Gale (1995) obtain similar results.
27address criticisms raised by Bernheim (1996) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996).
In Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) we explore an alternative identification strategy based
on 401(k) participation as well as eligibility y. We use SIPP data to compare 401(k) participants
with IRA participants who are ineligible for 401@) plans. Families in each group have chosen
to hold saving incentives, indicating they are “savers,” so we make the explicit assumption that
in the absence of 401(k)s, after conditioning on observable characteristics, saving of 401(k)
contributors would be the same as saving of IRA contributors. Between 1986 and 1991, IRA
tax preferences were restricted; moreover, contribution limits were higher for 401(k)s than
IRAs. Over this period, 401(k) contributions grew rapidly and IRA contributions plummeted.
Thus, if 401(k)s raise private wealth, wealth should have risen for 401(k) participants relative to
IRA participants not eligible for 401(k) plans. We found that this did not occur, and concluded
that 401(k)s did not raise wealth.
This test has been criticized on grounds that average tastes for saving among the 401(k)
group fell over time so that the result may be biased toward showing that 401(k)s do not raise
wealth (see Bernheim 1994, Hubbard and Skinner 1995, Poterba, Venti and Wise 1996). In
response, Engen and Gale (1995) create samples where IRA participation–a plausible indicator
of dilution once household characteristics are controlled for-does not change over time.34
Thus, they compare, for example, the change in wealth for 401(k) participants with IRAs to the
change in wealth for non-participants with IRAs. Results mirror those based on eligibility.
For homeowners, 401(k)s “raise” financial assets (subject to the caveats made above), but not
broader wealth measures that include home equity. For renters, 401(k)s have no economically
or statistically significant impact on net financial assets. These results provide no support for
“See also the discussion in Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994).
28the view that 401(k)s have raised wealth.
(VIII) Evidence from Panel Data
In panel data, the same households or individuals are followed over time. This controls
for certain types of household-specific heterogeneity in saving behavior. In practice, however,
the advantage has proven difficult to exploit in a satisfactory way.
Joines and Manegold (1995) use data
a random sample of tax returns in 1979 and
from the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel, which provides
follows the same taxpayers in subsequent years.35
Joines and Manegold note that if IRAs stimulate saving, those taxpayers made
for IRAs after the rule changes in 1981 should increase their saving relative to




should exceed the change in saving by continuing contributors, who contributed both before
and after 1981. This test therefore compares one group of contributors to another, rather than
comparing contributors to non-contributors. Controlling for taxpayer-specific effects, period
effects, and taxpayer characteristics, they conclude that between 19 and 26 percent of IRA
contributions were increases in national saving.3G
This estimate may be overstated, however. First, the effects of IRAs are measured on a
narrow measure of assets, which does not take into account the fact that IRA contributions can
be financed by increases in consumer debt, investment debt, or mortgage debt, a reduction in
tax-exempt bond holdings, a shift from tangible assets, or a reduced contribution to a thrift,
pension or a 401(k) plan. For example, Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994), using a similar sample,
‘additional information on the tax panel can be found in Slemrod (1988, 1990), and
Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1996).
3GEngen,Gale, and Scholz (1994) use a different extract of the tax panel to estimate similar
regressions and find somewhat less favorable results for IRAs.
29show that average non-mortgage debt rose by $2400 for IRA contributors over this period, but
by only $1350 for non-contributors. Median non-mofigage debt rose by $2,350 for
contributors compared to only about $100 for non-contributors. Second, the regressions are
estimated on a restricted sample that omits taxpayers aged 65 and over. For elderly households,
IRAs are likely to be good substitutes for taxable saving, since there is no withdrawal penalty.
The elderly represent about 12 percent of IRA contributions in the unrestricted sample.
An additional concern is that continuing contributors and new contributors may differ
in important ways that are not captured by the specification, which can lead to either an
understatement or an overstatement of the effects of IRAs.37 Finally, Poterba, Venti and Wise
(1996) note that the Joines and Manegold estimate may understate the effects of IRAs on saving
for households that do not contribute the limit amount. This bias is likely to be small,
however, because the vast majority of contributions were either at or very close to the limit: 75
percent of contributions in 1983, for example, were limit contributions, and another 13 percent
were contributions with one spouse at the limit (Burman, Cordes and Ozanne (1990). The
latter are typically households where the combined limit is $2,250 and the household
contributes $2,000.
Feenberg and Skinner (1989) use the same data set as Joines and Manegold and find that,
controlling for initial wealth, IRA holders increased their taxable saving by more than non-
contributory from 1982 to 1984. However, since contributors have stronger tastes for saving
371fcontinuing contributors have stronger tastes for saving, as Bernheim (1996) claims, and
if households with higher resets find IRAs to be better substitutes for saving than other
households, as Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate, then it seems likely that the concern with
differences between continuing and new contributors will lead to an overstatement of the
effects of IRAs on saving in the Joines and Manegold model. See Gale (1996) for further
discussion.
30than non-contributors, even after controlling for observable characteristics, the Feenberg and
Skinner finding is consistent with any view of the effects of IRAs on saving.
Venti and Wise (1995a) use panel data from the SIPP. They examine correlations
between changes in IRA contributions and a measure of non-IRA saving during 1984 and 1985
and find that the fall in non-IRA saving when people begin to contribute to an IRA is at most
only a small fraction of the typical IRA contribution. They conclude that IRAs raise overall
saving and may even crowd in additional non-IRA saving. The main problem with this test is
that there is no explicit assumption about saving behavior in the absence of the IRA program.
This omission is particularly problematic in this context because the study does not control for
any individual characteristics or period-specific individual or aggregate shocks to saving. Thus,
any change that moves IRA saving and non-IRA saving in the same direction—for example,
receipt of an inheritance, birth of a child, changes in income, or a decision to start saving for
retirement–is interpreted as evidence that the two forms of saving are not substitutes.36 In
addition, their sample omits persons over age 60, even though such households account for a
large portion of IRA contributions and are likely to find IRAs and other saving to be good
substitutes (Gale and Scholz, 1994). Also, the measure of non-IRA saving used is extremely
narrow, including only bank accounts, bonds and stocks. Substitution from other assets or
current saving to IRAs could occur in numerous ways not captured in this study.
Venti and Wise (1992) examine panel data from the 1983-6 Surveys of Consumer
Finances. They examine holdings of financial assets and claim, first, that
not save very much before IRAs became available, and, second, that IRA
IRA contributors did
contributors saved
38Thiswould be less of a problem had there been a change in IRA eligibility rules over the
period examined, as in the period studied by Joines and Manegold. However, there was no
change in IRA eligibility from 1984 to 1985.
31substantial amounts after IRAs became available. They conclude (p. 24) that “the 1986
contributors, prior to 1983, had not been accustomed to saving nearly as much as they saved
over the next three years.” Hence, they conclude that ~s represent new saving.
But financial assetsare only one component of wealth. Table 2 shows that most IRA
contributors held substantial amounts of housing equity. Homeownership requires having
saved for a downpayment in the past, and paying off the loan over time, which is also a form
of saving. Moreover, IRAs can substitute for other forms of wealth besides financial assets and
the reduced inflation and tax rates over this period encouraged this shift. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to examine broader wealth measures such as net financial wealth plus housing
equity .39
Trends in this broader measure of wealth lead to dramatically different conclusions. In
1983, the median among 1986 IRA contributors was $51,220.W Thus, it is simply incorrect to
claim that these families typically did little or no saving prior to 1983. Financial assetswere
only a small portion of wealth for this group. Over the next three years, all of these families
contributed to IRAs and their median wealth grew to $64,897.
IRAs?
grown
Does that increase represent more than those households would have saved without
We construct one estimate as follows. The initial wealth level would plausibly have
by 6 percent per year in nominal terms from 1983 and 1986.41 This alone would have
“This is the same wealth definition as used by Engen and Gale (1995).
‘“This figure is in 1983 dollars and omits all pension wealth (thrift, defined benefit, and
defined contribution plans), vehicle equity, second homes, business equity, and other items.
The median of net worth (omitting pension wealth) was about $75,000.
‘lMost classes of financial assets received returns significantly higher than 6 percent. See
Gale and Scholz (1994, Appendix A). Constantquality home prices grew at about 3.6 percent
per year over this period, but the actual increase in housing equity for households in the panel
32resulted in median 1986 wealth of $61,000. If the median family had made additional
contributions of $1,200 per year @lus the accumulated interest), it would have attained the
actual median 1986 wealth level. If a conservative 20 percent tax rate adjustment is made for
the fact that $6,000 of the 1986 wealth wm accumulated with tax deductible IRAs, new saving
of less than $9oO per year would have been sufficient to generate the 1986 wealth level. Venti
and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991), however, estimate that the marginal tax rate for IRA
contributors during this period was about 35 percent. Using this figure, new saving of just
$550 per year would have been sufficient to generate the 1986 wealth level.42
Since the median 1986 contributor was age 42 in 1983 and had net financial assets plus
housing equity over $51,000, we find it quite plausible to believe that the typical contributor
would have saved at least $9OO(or $55o) annually even in the absence of IRAs. This is
reinforced by the facts that saving rates typically rise over the life-cycle and median earnings for
the households in the sample rose by about 12 percent in real terms from 1983 to 1986 and
were $40,000 in 1986.
Substitution Between Pensions and 401k)s at the Firm Level
The research described above ignores interactions at the firm level between 401(k)s and
other pensions. This can create important biases in favor of finding that 401(k)s raise saving.
Suppose a worker in year 1 has $10,MO in assets and $5,000 in a pension (or after-tax thrift)
plan. In year 2, an otherwise identical worker has $10,000 in assets, but the firm has converted
would be larger because mortgage debt would be paid down.
42A number of features could be added to these estimates. For example, some of the
housing wealth in 1983 is due to capital gains on housing in the 1970s. To adjust for this, we
examined the sum of net financial assetsplus half of housing equity. These calculations implied
that households would have needed to save $1,300 per year ($1,000 with the 20 percent tax
adjustment, or $750 with the 35 percent adjustment) to reach the 1986 wealth median.
33the pension to a 401(k), and the worker has $5,000 in the 401(k). The cohort and successive
cross-section analyses dmcribed above omit data on pension and thrift balances, and so would
“show” that the worker in year 2 was eligible for a 401(k) and had $5,oOOmore in assets than
the worker in year 1, who was not eligible for a 401(k). The conclusion that 401(k) eligibility
raised saving would be inappropriate, however; the 401(k) balance just represents what
otherwise would have been in a pension.43
Many 401(k)s appear to have been converted directly from previously existing pension
or thrift plans. Because 401(k)s were not popular until the IRS issued clarifying regulations in
1981, most plans created before 1982 are thought to be conversions. In 1985, these plans
accounted for 85 percent of 401(k) balances, 39 percent of the plans, 65 percent of participants
with nonzero balances, and two-thirds of contributions.+ Even in 1991, the latest year
evaluated in successive cross-sections by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and in cohort analysis
by Venti and Wise (1996), the majority of assets, 42 percent of participants and 47 percent of
contributions were in plans created before 1982. This suggests the possibility that much of the
1991 401(k) wealth would have existed even in the absence of 401(k) plans.
Adopting a 401@) could also cause the outright termination of other plans. This
appears to have been a relatively rare response, at least in the early 1980s, (see Kruse 1991), but
431nthe example given, controlling for pension covera~e would solve the bias, but the
successive cross-section and cohort studies described above that claim saving incentives raise
saving do not control for pension coverage. Moreover, controlling for pension coverage, as
opposed to pension balances, would not help in more realistic situations where the worker in
period 2 still had a pension, but the pension balance was smaller than it otherwise would have
been, with the remainder of the balance made up by a 401(k).
‘These tabulations were carried out by Joel Dickson at the Federal Reserve Board, A
number of studies reach similar conclusions (see Andrews (1992), Papke, Petersen, and Poterba
(1993), and Buck Consultants (1989)).
34Papke (1995, 1996) finds stronger effects in more recent years. Papke (1996) uses panel data
from 1985 to 1992 and estimates that when a plan sponsor started out in 1985 with no 401(k)
or other defined contribution plan and then added a 401(k) over time, the number of defined
benefit plans offered by the sponsor fell by at least 0.3 more than it otherwise would have over
this period. Plan-level estimates imply that if a 401(k) plan is added by a sponsor, the
probability that a defined benefit plan is terminated increases by about 18 percentage points, or
approximately doubles. These results imply that a sizable minority of 401(k) plans are
replacing defined benefit plans.
An additional channel of substitution can occur on the margin–firms could cut back on
existing plans in other ways such as restricting or reducing benefit increases. In this case, and
in the case when 401(k)s represent converted thrift plans, households with 401(k)s would still
have defined benefit pension coverage-as is observed in the data-but 401(k)s would be
substituting for other pensions at the margin. Finally, it is also possible that some 401(k) plans
are established at firms that would have created another plan had 401(k)s not existed. Little is
known about these latter possibilities.
Taken together, these items suggest that a substantial portion of 401(k)s may be
replacing other pensions. Since all analyses of the effects of 401(k)s on saving ignore this
potential substitution, they are likely to overstate the impact of 401(k)s on saving.
To the extent that 401(k)s displace other plans completely or at the margin, an
additional issue comes into play. All workers covered by traditional plans participate, but
workers may well opt out of a 401(k). Thus, the saving impact of the 401(k) can be less than
that of the traditional plan it displaces (see Halperin (1987)). If so, 401(k)s could reduce private
saving even if they appear to raise saving in surveys that omit pension wealth.
35(X) Simulation models
Engen and Gale (1993) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) examine saving incentives in
a stochastic life-cycle simulation model that uses estimates of behavioral and economic
characteristics, like preference parameters and stochastic earnings patterns, to develop
quantitative predictions for saving behavior and its response to government policies. In the
model, households mmimize expected lifetime utility by choosing consumption and allocating
saving to a tax-preferred saving incentive or a conventional, fully-taxed asset.45 Decisions are
made subject to a lifetime budget constraint, net asset constraints, uncertain future earnings,
and uncertain mortality. For present purposes, the most interesting implications of the model
involve the plausible impact of saving incentives and the ability to distinguish short-term and
long-term effects on saving.4A
The model indicates that in the long run, both IRAs and 401(k) plans can stimulate
national saving. After 70 years, IRAs raise the steady state national saving rate from 5.9
percent to 6.2 percent. Between 22 and 30 percent of IRA contributions represent new saving
in the long run. As modelled here, 401(k) plans have stronger effects due to a higher
451RAshave tax-deductible contributions, and a limit of either $2,OOOor $4,000. 401(k)
plans have a limit of $9,000. Employers are assumed to match employee 401(k) contributions
at the rate of 50°/0, up to the first 5% of salary. The early withdrawal penalty is set at 10
percent for both plans.
4sThe simulations demonstrate that many observed empirical patterns concerning IRAs,
401(k)s and saving can be generated by a well-specified model of utility maximization. At the
aggregate level, model results are broadly consistent with U.S. historical data. The model
generates aggregate interest elasticities of saving between 0.15 and 0.35, consistent with
empirical estimates, which generally fall between zero and 0.4. At the individual level, the
model generates hump-shaped consumption-age profiles, and age-wealth profiles that are
consistent with microdata for much of the population. Like the data, the model shows saving
incentive participation rising with age and income. Model results also match well with real
world data on the proportion of households with a saving incentive, the percentage of
contributors that contribute to the limit, and the persistence of contributions over time.
36contribution limit and the employer match: Iong-mn national saving rises by between 0.5 and
1.0 percentage points.
However, the short-term and transitional effects are very different. As shown in Figure
2, private and national saving ~ following the implementation of IRAs (or other saving
incentives) and do not recover their original level for decades. The intuition is that before
IRAs are introduced, all assets are held in taxable forms. When IRAs become available, people
start shifting out of taxable assets into IRAs. This process takes time because of the annual
contribution limit. Eventually, households run out of funds to shift or reach optimal
portfolios, and new households (with no initial taxable wealth to shift) enter the economy, so
the extent of shifting falls and more of the contributions represent new saving. The interest
elasticity of saving in the model is positive, but its effect is swamped in the first years of the
program by the shifting of already existing taxable assets. The private asset-to-income ratio
does not return to its original level until 36 years after IRAs are introduced.
Government saving falls initially due to the shifting of assets. Eventually, government
revenues rise as IRA balances are withdrawn, but even in the long-term, government revenues
are below what they would have been in the absence of IRAs (the national debt is positive).
Thus, in the short run, national saving falls by even more than private saving, because of the
deferral of taxes on contributions and investment earnings. The national (public plus private)
xset-to-income ratio falls from the start and does not regain its initial value until year 49 of the
transition .47
The simulation results are consistent with our findings in the empirical sections
47The same intuition and behavioral patterns occur for 401(k) plans. However, since
contribution limits are larger for 401(k)s, shifting occurs more rapidly. The private (national)
asset-to-income ratio regains its original level by year 22 (35).
37described above, because the empirical work covers only the first 10-15 years of the programs,
during which very little if any of the contributions to saving incentives should be new saving
according to the simulation.
This simulation model, like all such models, is imperfect in a number of ways, and the
precise magnitude of the estimates should be regarded with care. Nonetheless, we find the
qualitative behavioral patterns generated by the model to be both plausible and robust to a
wide variety of sensitivity analyses.
The most important caveat is that, for a number of reasons, we believe the model
overstates the long-term effects of saving incentives on private saving. First, general
equilibrium effects are omitted. Allowing for these effects would dampen the long-term
increase in saving: as the capital stock rose, interest rates would begin to fall, which would
diminish the long-run increase in saving. Second, the model overstates the effective 401(k) limit
and substantially overstates 401(k) participation among 10w-income households, for whom
saving incentive contributions are largely new saving.
incentive is financed with an increased public deficit.
this would further reduce private saving. Fourth, we
Third, the model assumes the saving
If instead income tax rates were raised,
have assumed that all wealth other than
saving incentives is liquid; this raises the demand for saving incentives.
For a similar set of reasons, the model may also overstate the length of the “transition
period” during which the cumulative effect of saving incentives is less than zero (See Hubbard
and Skinner 1995). overstating the length of the transition period, though, is vastly different
from claiming there is no transition period.4K
4BThelatter claim is much stronger and is
(1990), who use data from 1982 and find that
expansion of IRA eligibility.
The model suggests that introducing saving
implicitly made, for example, by Venti and Wise
IRAs raised saving immediately after the
38incentives would cause a lengthy transition period, during which contributions on average
would not represent increases in saving.
Moreover, making adjustments to reduce the length of the transition period also reduces
the estimated long-inn impact on saving. For example, introducing illiquid, tax-preferred assets,
such as housing, would reduce the extent of initial shifting into saving incentives, and thereby
reduce the transition period, but would also reduce long-inn demand for saving incentives and
their ultimate impact on saving.49
Finally, Hubbard and Skinner (1995) characterize the simulations as showing that–in the
long run-the ratio of the increase in private capital to the increase in public debt is 16 to 1 for
401(k)s. However, it should also be noted that the ratio is negative for the first 30 to 40 years
of the transition. So unless policymakers are certain that the policy will stay in place for a
very long time, the model suggests that introducing saving incentives will not raise private and
national saving.
fm Offsettin~ Revenue Effects?
Although the discussion above focuses primarily on private saving, the impact of tax
incentives on national saving depends also on how such incentives affect public saving,
Contributions to saving incentives cause an immediate increase in the budget deficit because the
contribution is taxdeductible. To the extent that taxable private saving is shifted into a saving
incentive, current and future tax revenues from that saving and the investment earnings are
lost. In the long term the saving incentive contribution (and associated earnings) is eventually
withdrawn, raising future tax revenues. And to the extent that saving incentives raise saving,
49Adding non-liquid wealth to the model has effects similar to raising the penalty for early
withdrawal. Engen and Gale (1993, table 7) show that raising the penalty reduces the net effect
on long-term national saving.
39they may also raise domestic investment, which may produce additional corporate tax revenues.
In simulations in Engen and Gale (1993) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994), public
saving is negative for many years after saving incentives are introduced. Annual public saving
eventually turns positive as the funds are cashed in, but the public debt is immediately and
permanently higher with the incentives than without. Corporate tax payments are not
considered, but if they had been, revenues would have fallen further in the short and medium
term as national saving fell, before rebounding in the long term.
Feldstein (1995) considers all of the effects above and finds that saving incentives have a
substantial, positive impact on public saving. While Feldstein is surely correct in including the
impact on corporate taxes, his estimates overstate and may even produce the wrong sign for the
revenue effects. First, he assumes that in the long run at least half or more of IRA
contributions are new saving. For all of the reasons noted in this survey, this estimate appears
high.j” He also may overstate the increase in investment due to an increase in saving. He
assumes that 100 percent of increases in domestic saving turns into increased domestic
investment. But the correlation between domestic saving and domestic investment is less than
one and appears to be falling over time. Feldstein also overstates the effective tax rate on new
investment. He assumes that new investment faces a business-level tax of 17 to 34 percent as
well as individual-level taxes of 15 to 25 percent. But investments in housing, state and local
governments, non-incorporated businesses, or foreign countries can face lower effective tax
rates. Auerbach (1996) estimates a combined business- and individual-level average marginal tax
rate on new investment of 16 percent.
50Evenin the simulation models noted above that generated a positive long-run impact of
IRAs on saving, only 22 percent of IRA contributions are net additions to saving in the long
run when the limit is $2,OOOas Feldstein assumed.
40Addressing these and other issues not only dramatically reduces the favorable impacts of
IRAs on public revenues, but under plausible conditions reverses the sign of the effects as well
(Ruggeri and Fougere, 1995).5’ In summary, the impact of saving incentives on long-n.tn public
saving is a currently unresolved issue and depends critically on their impact on private saving as
well as on details on the private economy.
q Evidence from Canada
Registered Retirement Saving Programs (RRSPS) are Canadian saving incentives:
contributions are taxdeductible, earnings accrue tax-free, and withdrawals are taxed, but there
is no early withdrawal penalty. Carroll and Summers (1987) find that Canadian saving rose
relative to American saving in the early to mid-1970s, when increased RRSP contribution limits
raised RRSP contributions. But Altig (1990) shows that the impact of RRSP contributions
vanishes when a borrowing variable-to account for the fact that mortgage interest is not
deductible in Canada–is included in the regression.
Venti and Wise (1995b) conclude that RRSPS raise saving, based on a variety of tests
using survey data. These tests generally mirror the structure of their tests using American data
and hence raise many of the same issues described above.
Sabelhaus (1996) shows that trends in the composition of aggregate saving do not
support the view that RRSPS have raised saving. The increase in Canadian relative to
American saving in the 1970s occurred because non-retirement saving rose dramatically in
51 Ruggeri and Fougere (1995) note that the assumed real rate of return on private capital, 10
percent, appears to be higher than recent norms and therefore overstates the likely revenue
from added investment; and the assumed real return on government bonds, 2 percent, appears
to be below recent norms. In addition, they note that when IRAs are introduced, the deficit
rises, but in Feldstein’s model, there is no mechanism to finance the increase in deficits.
Hubbard and Skinner (1995) present alternative estimates of the long-run impact of IRAs.
41Canada relative to the United States. Canadian retirement saving (which includes RRSPS)
actually fell slightly relative to American retirement saving. The same points apply to longer-
term changes comparing the 1960s and 1990s: saving increased in Canada relative to the U.S,
but retirement saving did not. The increase is due to large relative changes in non-retirement
saving. These trends do not suggest an important role for RRSPS in raising saving.
~fxI
Standard economic models suggest that existing saving incentives should have had little
effect on saving, except perhaps in the long run. Others, however, argue that saving incentives
raise saving and appeal to alternative theories based on psychological approaches to saving (see
Bernheim 1996, Thaler 1990). There appears to be a presumption that psychological or
behavioral models imply that saving incentives raise saving. In general, however, that
presumption is incorrect. There are many ways that saving incentives can fail to raise saving
even if psychological motives are present and even if they are dominant.
For example, Bernheim (1996) and Thaler (1994) note that a key element in
psychological models of saving is the issue of self-control. If so, psychological models may be
most applicable to people who do not save very much. Households with saving incentives tend
to save substantial amounts overall. Thus, there could be many households using saving
incentives and many households that act mainly according to psychological motives, but the
overlap between the two sets may not be very large. If so, the existence of psychological
motives would have little impact on existing incentives .52
Laibson (1996) demonstrates that illiquid saving accounts can raise saving in a model
52However, it is not obvious that psychological models are most likely to apply to those
that save very little. High-saving households could be those that have solved their self-
discipline problems.
42where people suffer from self-control problems. But the illiquid accounts in his model require
net saving whereas current incentives reward gross contributions. Moreover, as he notes, the
positive effect on saving can easily be removed in his model if consumers can take actions in
later years to remove the funds prematurely. Since these actions include increasing borrowing,
which can be done currently, Laibson’s model implies that current saving incentives do not
necessarily raise saving even in a model that emphasizes self-control problems.
Second, to the extent that psychological motives do matter, they may have their
primary impact on portfolio composition rather than the level of saving.53 For example, many
contributions for a given tax year are made in the following calendar year. It seems to us that
people would be much more likely to shift money into an IRA at the last minute if the
represents idle cash than if the money were destined to pay for some large consumption
say a family vacation. If so, then portfolio composition is affected rather than saving.
money
item,
Advertising provides another example. Most IRA contributors have saved substantial amounts
in other forms and so are aware of the opportunities for saving. The information contained in
advertising about IRAs may well be the presence of a tax deduction for doing what the
household was already doing without a tax deduction. If so, then the primary impact will be
on pofifolio composition.
Third, target saving-an alternative to the life-cycle model–occurs when households save
to reach specific wealth targets-for example, a downpayment on a house, college tuition, or a
particular income replacement ratio. Target saving seems to be a plausible way to allow
households to apply simple but effective rules to potentially complex long-term saving
decisions. In fact, a version of target saving is cited in Doyle and Johnson (1991) as the most
53 Browning and Lusardi (1995) make a similar point.
43common retirement planning technique. A distinctive feature of target saving is that higher
rates of return reduce the amount of saving needed to reach the target. Thus, to the extent
that people are saving to reach specific retirement targets, saving incentive programs will reduce
overall private saving, since the saving incentives offer a higher rate of return on a limited
amount of contributions.
Finally, what Bernheim (1996) describes as a “scarcity of welldeveloped organizing
principles” means that many possible channels for psychological models need to be explored.
For example, Bernheim notes that a tax subsidy for targeted saving may raise saving because it
conveys information to people that authorities think saving is important. But people may
instead receive the message that authorities think saving is such an unpleasant task that it
deserves a tax break. In that case, those without saving incentive oppofiunities may reduce
their saving, and those with such opportunities may reduce their taxable saving by as much or
more than their saving incentive contribution.
In summary, we view alternative models of saving as an important new direction for
future research, but, to this point at least, we find nothing in the models or interpretations that
represents evidence that saving incentives raise saving, and at least one prominent alternative
model (target saving) suggests that saving incentives should reduce saving.
Finally, it is often difficult to identify patterns of saving behavior that can distinguish
between realistic versions of life-cycle models and psychological models. Researchers sometimes
“test” what can only be regarded as straw man versions of the life-cycle model that include
many ancillary assumptions (perfect markets, no transaction costs, no uncertainty, perfect
information, etc.). Rejecting such models does not prove that more plausible life-cycle
44specifications are inappropriate.54
But distinguishing between the life-cycle and psychological approaches need not be an
to prove declslve In determining whether saving
likely to contain elements of both forward-looking
motives. The relative importance of these
“either or” choice, and is unlikely in itself
, .,. , . . .,
incentives raise saving. Saving behavior is
life-cycle behavior as well as psychological
approaches may differ across households, over time, and possibly even over time for a
particular household. Ultimately, the best research will develop and test falsifiable hypotheses
using insights from both approaches.55
fXIw Conclusion
We find that saving incentive plans have had little if any effects on household saving
behavior. Other studies have come to the opposite conclusion, and a major goal of the paper
has been to reconcile the divergence between our results and the other findings. In particular,
we show that each finding that saving incentives raise saving can be traced to various biases
that overstate the effects of saving incentives, and that removing the biases also removes the
positive effect of the incentives on saving.
For example, cross-sectional analyses of IRAs that assume that contributors and non-
contributory have similar tastes for saving are biased in favor of finding that IRAs raise saving;
comparing limit contributors to other contributors removes the bias and generates estimates
that IRAs had virtually no impact on saving. Cross-sectional studies of 401@) plans raise
54Forexample, the fungibility of assets is sometimes taken to be a primary implication of
the life-cycle model by advocates of psychological models (see Thaler 1990). But in the
presence of real world considerations such as transactions costs, illiquidity and uncertainty,
fungibility is no longer an implication of the life-cycle approach.
55Forfurther discussion of psychological models and saving incentives, see Engen, Gale and
Scholz (1994) and Gale (1996).
45similar concerns: 401(k) eligibility y is positively correlated with households’ tastes for saving;
controlling for initial wealth as an (imperfect) measure of tastm for saving generates estimates
that less than 10 percent of 401(k) contributions represent new saving. In cohort studies, there
is no role for saving incentives to raise financial assets once allowances are made for the effects
of abnormally high equity returns and interest rates during the sample period, the increase in
debt, the shift away from non-financial assets caused by reduced inflation and tax rates, the
decline of pensions and social security, the difference between pre- and post-tax asset balances,
and underlying data problems. Successive cross-section studies suffer from many of the same
problems as cohort analysis; measuring the effects of 401(k)s on a broader measure of wealth
that includes housing equity indicates virtually no effect of 401(k) plans on saving. In panel
studies, examining broader asset measures suggests little impact of IRAs on saving. All of these
approaches ignore substitution between 401(k)s and pensions at the firm level, which causes a
further overstatement of the impact of saving incentives on saving. Moreover, all of these
findings are consistent with the observed trends in the level and composition of aggregate
saving and with results from simulation models, which show essentially no impact of saving
incentives on saving, at least in the time period considered.
We note, however, that our results are consistent with the possibility that existing
saving incentives have raised saving for some individuals, that saving incentives may eventually
raise saving, and that saving incentives in different forms might raise saving.
Our findings fit well into the hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation, as
developed by Slemrod (1992) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1996) in their careful reviews of
studies of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on economic behavior. They find that decisions
concerning the timing of economic transactions are the most clearly responsive to tax
46considerations. The next tier of responses include financial and accounting choices, such as
allocating a given amount of saving to tax-preferred versus other assets. The least responsive
category of behavior applies to agents’ real decisions, such as the level of saving.
Our findings are consistent with this hierarchy in that we find a strong effect of tax-
based saving incentives on the allocation of saving and assets, but little or no effect on the level
of saving or wealth accumulation. Saving is painful; it requires a reduction in current living
standards in exchange for an increase in future living standards. If people can obtain the same
increase in future living standards without the pain of reducing current consumption, then we
expect people to choose that route over reducing current consumption. Our reading of the
evidence is that people have by and large taken the less painful route to financing saving
incentives, or at least have taken that route first. The plausibility of this notion and the fact
that similar patterns have been discovered in a wider range of economic activities gives us more
confidence in its applicability to saving issues as well.
One caveat to our results is that all of the data sets and experiments used to explore
these issues–by us and by others–are faulty in some important way. Thus, it is unclear that
there is a completely satisfactory way, given existing data, to address these issues.
Also, we cannot distinguish among various remons why saving incentives have not
appeared to work well to date (Slemrod 1994). One possibility y is that existing incentives are
poorly designed (Bernheim and Scholz 1993a). Another possibility is that households have very
low intertemporal elasticities of substitution (Hall 1988). If so, it may prove difficult to
stimulate saving via any voluntary mechanism. Alternatively, people may be uninformed about
the need and opportunities for saving, in which case educational programs may help. Or
saving incentives may eventually raise saving, even if they have not done so yet, in which the
47case the policy implication is to be patient.
Finally, we do not address whether saving incentives are a desirable feature of tax
policy. If saving incentives do raise private saving, there is a question as to whether they do so
at an acceptable cost. Even if they do not raise saving at all, there may be equity reasons to
provide access to saving incentives to certain groups, such as households that do not have
pension coverage. Issues relating to the equity and efficiency of tax-based saving incentives are
beyond the scope of this paper, but are interesting items for future research.
48APPENDIX A
This Appendix provides more detail on the Gale and Scholz (1994) model and briefly
addresses criticisms put forth by Bernheim (1996) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996).
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Equation (1) shows desired IRA saving, ST, as a function of observable characteristics X.
Equation (2) shows that the observed IRA contribution, S1,must be no smaller than zero and
no larger than the annual contribution limit, L.
Equation (3) describes households’ non-IRA saving, SO. The effect of a given X variable
(such as age or earnings) is allowed to differ across households that contribute to IRAs (YJ and
households that do not (yl). Moreover, the error terms describing unobserved determinants in
behavior are also allowed to differ across contributors (~) and noncontributory (cJ.
The effect on non-IRA saving of a one dollar change in the contribution limit is given by
q. The term S1 - L represents the excess of desired IRA saving over the maximum allowed IRA
49saving, and q measures how this difference affects non-IRA saving. If q is close to 1,then
almost all excess desired IRA saving appears as non-IRA saving. Thus, a change in the IRA
contribution limit would have little effect on the overall level saving. If q is close to zero, then
almost none of the excess desired IRA saving shows up as non-IRA saving, and increasing the
IRA limit would raise total saving.
In the empirical model, q is parameterized as a linear function of the household
characteristics. This specification captures the crucial point that substitutability between IRAs
and other saving should depend on household characteristics. The elements of q are identified
by comparing the non-IRA saving of limit contributors to the non-IRA saving of households
that contribute positive amounts but less than the limit, rather than by comparing limit
contributors to non-contributors.
Bernheim (1996) notes that if limit contributors have stronger unobservable preferences
for saving than interior contributors, the GS model may be biased toward finding that IRAs are
not new saving. But he provides no evidence in support of his assumption about unobserved
preferences or the quantitative importance of the bias. We believe that even if the assumption
is valid, the quantitative importance of the bias is likely to be small. One reason is that GS
already control for a large number of observable characteristics to account for heterogeneity in
saving behavior across limit and interior contributors. Moreover, we have estimated regressions
using the 1983 SCF sample of all limit and interior contributors and controls for all of the
covariates in the GS model except those relating to wealth. These regressions show that the
coefficient on a dummy variable for limit contributors is negative and insignificant in equations
explaining 1983 wealth. If unobserved tastes for saving were higher among limit contributors
than interior contributors, this coefficient should be positive and significant. These regressions
50are inconsistent with Bernheim’s concern that limit contributors have higher tastes for saving
than interior contributors.
In contrast, in the Venti-Wise model (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991), limit contributors are
compared to (i.e., are required to have the same coefficients as) non-contributors. Regressions
using the 1983 SCF, similar to the ones described above but where the sample includes IRA
contributors and non-contributors, indicate that the coefficient on the IRA contributor dummy
variable is about $26,000 and is statistically significant. Thus, the regressions show that there
are large differences in tastes for saving between IRA contributors and non-contributors, but
little if any difference between interior contributors and limit contributors. Therefore, we
believe the GS comparison is appropriate and we find no reason to believe that the assumptions
underlying Bernheim’s bias argument are applicable.
Poterba, Venti and Wise (PVW, 1996) make several claims regarding the Gale and Scholz
(1994) model.
The Data and Sample: PVW first criticize the sample choices. In their descriptive tables,
GS excluded households under age 25 in 1986 (because the developers of the survey thought the
data for these households were unreliable), households that changed marital status (because it is
not possible to calculate the applicable IRA limit for such households), and the self-employed
@ecause of difficulties in distinguishing Keogh and IRA contributions).
For their formal estimates, GS also exclude households aged 65 and older in 1983 because
of the complications in modelling saving by the elderly. In contrast, GS include these
households in the descriptive work because the households are in fact eligible to contribute to
IRAs and, for reasons described in the text, the proportion of contributions that come from
those older than 59 is a relevant piece of information. The idea that older households are
51unlikely to contribute, as Poterba, Venti and Wise assert, is neither supported by evidence nor
relevant to whether such households should be in the sample. These households are eligible to
contribute, until age 70.5.If they find IRAs to be good substitutes for other saving (because
there is no withdrawal penalty for those over 59.5), then excluding these households from the
formal estimates will bias the results toward overstating the effects of IRAs on saving.
Finally, for the formal estimates GS also excluded about 180 households (out of 2,822 in
the overall sample) that had absolute values of 1983-6 non-IRA saving that exceeded $100,000.
This exclusion is due to difficulties in modelling the saving behavior of the very wealthy. As
PVW note, this exclusion has a large effect on sample means of saving. More importantly, as
noted by GS and PVW, the estimates of substitution exhibit a good deal of sensitivity to the
cutoff points that are chosen. What PVW fail to note, however, is that the exclusion should
bias the GS results toward finding less substitution than actually exists, since the exclusion
eliminates a disproportionate number of high-income, very high-wealth households that should
find IRAs to be very good substitutes for other saving. Notably, both GS (1994) and PVW
(1996) in their critique show this to be true: the estimates that impose higher cutoff thresholds
generally lead to smaller effects of IRAs on saving than estimates that impose lower cutoffs.
The broadest thresholds in the PVW replication, which of course are most closely related to
the complete sample of eligible households,
runs did.
show substantial substitution, just as the central GS
None of these sample restrictions seem implausible or inappropriate.5G
A Simple Reality Check: PVW (1996, Table 15) show that a measure of the financial
5hContrary to PVW’S assertion (1996, page 65, item (2)), GS did not delete households that
they thought were unlikely to contribute to IRAs.
52assets of a panel of IRA contributors rose from 1983 to 1986, while financial assetsof a panel
of noncontributory did not. PVW also claim, based on financial asset data, that IRA
contributors were not saving very much before IRAs. PVW perform a “simple reality check”
and ask how GS could possibly find, in light of these results, that IRA contributions could be
funded by reductions in other wealth or saving.
The “simple reality check” is seriously misleading. First, the GS results are based on
comparisons of limit contributors and interior contributors, while the PVW table compares
those with and without IRAs. Second, holding observable factors constant, differences in tastes
for saving imply that a panel of contributors would be expected to save more than a panel of
non-contributors even in the absence of IRAs. That is, comparisons of households with and
without IRAs are biased in favor of finding that IRAs raise saving, Indeed, PVW (1996, page 3)
note that: “Some people save and others don’t, and the savers tend to save more in all forms.
For example, families with IRAs also have more conventional savings than families without
IRAs. ” We agree with the quote, and note that it also undermines the logic of the “simple
reality check. ”
The reality check is faulty in other ways as well. The PVW table does not control for
any observable household characteristics, while the GS analysis does. Median three-year
income among IRA contributors during this period was $58,000 higher than among non-
contributory (see Gale and Scholz 1994). It would not be surprising if an income difference of
that size influenced saving. Moreover, PVW examine a narrow measure of financial assets. A
broader measure, as in table 2 of our text, shows substantially smaller growth. Because
financial assets are only a small portion of wealth, it is simply incorrect to claim that IRA
holders did little saving before 1983. Median net worth among IRA holders was over $75,000
53in 1983.This indicates substantial prior saving activity.~’ Finally, many factors besides saving
incentives caused financial assetsto rise (see section W on cohort data). Aggregate financial
assetsrose by $2.6 trillion between 1983 and 1986, while saving incentive balances rose by less
than $3OObillion.
In short, the simple reality check is uninformative. There is nothing inconsistent with it
and the results in GS (1994). These issues are explored further in section VIII of this paper,
which examines the panel data from the SCF in more detail and interprets the findings as
showing little new saving.
Savin~ Effects of Increasing the Limit: PVW claim that GS severely understate the
proportion of contributions or contributors at the limit, since only households that contribute
to the limit in all three years are identified as “limit” contributors in GS. This assessment is
correct if one is looking at a limit change over a one year period. But over the three-year
period covered by the SCF data, it is not accurate. GS (1994, table 1) compare their
constructed IRA variable to data from the IRS tax panel. GS show that the constructed
variable matches closely the proportion of the population contributing to an IRA at least once
and more importantly the percentage of IRA contributors that contributed to the limit in all
three years. In the IRS panel, households that contributed to the limit in each of the three
years accounted for 68 percent of all of the limit contributions during that period. Therefore,
in examining limit increases over a three-year period, the GS approach captures two-thirds of
the limit contributions.
“For example, suppose a household saved $10,000 a year for five years and then put all the
funds into a downpayment on house. After the purchase, an analysis using financial assets
would mistakenly conclude that the household had not saved anything in the past, since its
financial assets were zero. It is worth noting that most IRA contributors already own their
own home.
54Pm also claim that using descriptive data from 1986 (as GS do) on financial assetsof
IRA holders is extremely misleading because it does not show how much wealth was available
at the beginning of the program to substitute into IRAs, nor does it show the typical saving
behavior of contributors before IRAs. However, since IRA contributions can be funded by
shifting pre-existing assets or funds that would have been saved anyway, we do not find 1986
wealth data misleading. As noted above, financial assets rose for many reasons between 1983
and 1986. Looking at the 1986 figures show how much was actually saved in other forms and
therefore how much would have been available to shift into IRAs had the limits been larger,
which is the question GS address. Moreover, even if one does focus on 1983data, the typical
IRA contributor had already saved substantial amounts by 1983: $16,500 in NIFA and $77,299
in net worth.
The Gale Scholz Model: PVW raise a number of issues concerning the GS empirical
model. PVW argue that the specification of q should include a marital status term and that the
other equations should as well. This variable had been included in earlier versions of the paper
(for example, Gale and Scholz (1990)), where its estimated effects were small and statistically
insignificant, and where it had little effect on the results. The correlation between family size,
which is included in the specification, and marital status may explain why marital status does
not affect the results.
PW also note there is no constant in the specification of q. This is only a problem if
the true constant is not zero. But consider what a constant in the specification of q would
represent: the substitutability between IRAs and other saving for someone with no assets (or
any of the other co-variates such as income or education). Given that substitutability should
rise with assets, the appropriate constant is likely to be zero, so that including a constant in ~
55would have little effect on the results. What is particularly puzzling about this criticism is that,
in their replication of the GS results, PVW actually show that including a constant in q does
not substantially alter the estimated substitutability of IRAs and other saving.sa
PVW also note-as do Gale and Scholz (1994)–that the mean of q is sensitive to changes in
the values of the right hand side variables. We note that this occurs partly because GS did not
constrain q to fall within a given range. That the unconstrained value of q estimated in the
various models presented in GS fall within the reasonable range of estimates is a strength of the
model. In contrast, the VW models (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991) constrain the substitution
parameter to be between zero and one, which eliminates even the possibility of households
being target savers or having income effects due to IRAs that are stronger than the substitution
effects. VW do not report the results of unconstrained estimates, even though actual
substitutability could be outside the restricted range.
PVW also undertake a number of curious steps in estimating and examining the GS
results: (a) they omit non-IRA financial assets (NIFA) as an explanatory variable; (b) they
omit many of the other right hand side variables; (c) they set q equal to a constant across
households; and (d) they focus on estimates
the effects of the IRA limit. As GS explain
can be learned from such exercises.
of non-IRA saving by limit contributors that ignore
in the original paper and as we discuss below, little
First, consider the specification that omits NIFA. NIFA is a crucial variable, derived
from the theoretical model in GS. Families with higher NIFA holdings are more likely to have
IRAs and to find IRAs better substitutes for other saving. NIFA also helps control for
5gTheir table 20, specification H shows the effects of adding a constant term in q to the GS
specification. The estimated mean of q is 1.25, which is slightly higher than the corresponding
estimate in specification F without a constant, 1,17.
56individual tastesfor saving, as it does in the Venti and Wise models.
PVW argue that NIFA is a poor control for individual tastm for saving because the
coefficient is negative, implying that those with more resets consume more. As GS note,
though, in any cross-sectional study (even in the VW model), existing wealth can influence
saving in either of two directions. For a particular person, higher initial wealth should mean
higher consumption and therefore less saving, controlling for income. Across people, higher
initial wealth will be correlated with tastes for saving and so would indicate more saving. The
actual coefficient on NIFA reflects both of these considerations. The fact that the coefficient is
negative does not mean the variable is not controlling for individual tastes for saving, it just
means that the first effect is larger than the second effect.
PVW also argue that because the GS saving measure is calculated using NIFA in 1983,
meuurement error is induced and that this measurement error drives the GS results.
Measurement error could be present, but we do not think it is of any major quantitative
importance for two reasons. First, if measurement error were driving the results, one would
also expect the coefficient on NIFA to be negative in the saving equation for non-contributors,
but it is not (see GS 1994 Table 4). Second, if measurement error were driving the estimates,
then moving to broader measures of saving that do not depend exclusively on NIFA should
generate less estimated substitution. In fact, it generates more (see GS 1990). Therefore, we do
not believe measurement error is actually a serious problem here. GS (1994) present further
evidence on measurement error.
The second curious adjustment is the omission of almost all of the right hand side
variables other than income. The purpose of this adjustment is unclear, especially given the
tremendous residual variation in asset holdings that GS note in their paper and PVW document
57when controlling only for income and age. Our view is that if the problem is trying to control
for unobservable differences in tastes for saving, it makes sense first to control for as many
observable influences on saving as is practical. That is the strategy GS followed.
The third curious adjustment is setting q equal to a constant. Both theory and common
sense (and the empirical patterns) suggest that setting q to a constant is a meaningless exercise.
The substitution between ~As and other saving should vary with individual characteristics.
GS included all of the X variables in q to ensure that they were not identifying the effects of
IRAs with arbitrary exclusion restrictions. PVW refer to keeping all of the variables in q as
“adding complexity, ” but it is no different than what VW do in their own work on this topic.
The fourth issue is that PVW remove NIFA from the specification and then examine the
effects of doing so on the fitted value of non-IRA saving. These results (PVW 1996, Table 22,
second column) show that, when the spillover effect of excess desired IRA saving on non-IRA
saving is omitted, adding NIFA to the specification causes the GS model to understate non-IRA
saving by limit contributors. The key problem with this exercise is that the impact of the IRA
limit is ignored. A crucial feature of the GS model is that the expected non-IRA saving of
limit contributors depends on how much IRA saving they are allowed to do. Therefore, it is
not interesting to examine the expected non-IRA saving of limit contributors without allowing
for impact of the IRA limit.
1996, table 22, third column)
Including the spillover from excess desired IRA saving (PVW
eliminates the understatement of non-IRA saving from including
NIFA. Moreover, the fitted values including NIFA and including the spillover effect from
other saving are reasonable.
In summary, it is not surprising that removing key features of the GS model changes the
results. The point is that it is not informative. All
58
of these adjustments have direct analoguesin the Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991) models. If these adjustments were critical or
even relevant, it is surprising Venti and Wise do not report the outcome of making these
changes in their own model.
59APPENDIX B
This Appendix provides an example of the bias created when cross-section regressions
estimate the effects of 401(k) eligibility y on wealth, but control for cash earnings rather than
total compensation. The particular example is constructed so that the true effect of 401(k)
eligibility on wealth is assumed to be zero, but the estimated effect–controlling for cash
earnings rather than total compensation–is positive. But the general point holds for any degree
of underlying offset between 401(k)s and other saving: the estimated impact will overstate the
true impact.
In this example, interest, discount and inflation rates are set to zero, for simplicity. As
shown in Appendix Table B-1, worker A has total compensation in period 1 of 110 units, of
which 100 units are paid as a cash wage and 10 are paid as employer 401(k) contributions .59
The worker
assetsat the
smooths consumption at 55 units per period, and so holds 55 units of financial
end of period 1. (The manner in which this is divided among 401(k)s and other
saving does not matter for the example, but to be concrete, suppose the employee places 10
the 401(k) along with the employer’s 10, so the overall allocation is 20 in the 401(k) and 35
other saving). Worker B has the same cash wages of 100 in period 1, but no 401(k). The
in
in
worker smooths consumption at 50 units per period, and holds 50 units of financial assets (all
in non401 (k) saving) at the end of period 1.
Now
workers at
consider the results of estimating the impact of 401(k) eligibility on these two
the end of period 1, controlling for cash wages. Let the estimating equation be Z =
‘Tor purposes of this example, it does not matter whether the contributions are matching
or unconditional. Most 401(k) participants receive employer contributions.
60aW + ~E, where Z is financial assets including 401(k)s, W is cash wages and E indicates 401(k)
eligibility. The equations would be 55= a100 + D for worker A and 50= a100 for worker B.
The equations imply estimates of a= 0.5 and ~= 5. In short, since worker A has 5 more units
of wealth, the estimated coefficient on 401(k) eligibility is 5.
However, the true offset-the reduction in other wealth from deferring a part of
compensation, holding total compensation constant–is 100 percent. The true offset can be
estimated by regressing wealth on total compensation and 401(k) eligibility y. The equations in
this case are 55= u11O+ ~ and 50= a100, implying estimates of CY = 0.5 and @=O.
The same biases occur if the goal is to measure the proportion of 401(k) contributions
that represent new saving. In the example above, worker A would have 20 in 401(k) balances
at the end of year 1. Let the estimating equation be Z = aW + YX, where Z and W are
defined as above and X indicates 401(k) balances. The equations would be 55= cr100+720 for
worker A and 50= a100 for worker B, implying estimates of a= 0.5 and y = 0.25. That is, the
equation would suggest that 25 percent of 401(k) contributions represent new saving even
though the true value in this example is zero. As before, controlling for total compensation
would provide the correct estimated ~ of zero.
For further discussion and generalization of these results, see Bernheim and Scholz (1993b)
and Gale (1995).
61Appendix Table B-1
Controlling for Total Compensation versus Cash Wages
Period
Worker Income and Wealth 1 2
A Cash earnings 100 0
Employer Contribution 10 0
Consumption 55 55
Wealth* 55 0
B Cash earnings 100 0
Employer Contribution o 0
Consumption 50 50
Wealth* 50 0
— Estimated impact of 401(k) 5 —
eligibility using
cash earnings
“Wealth measures are reported at the end of the period.
62APPENDIX C
This Appendix provides further discussion of the results in Engen and Gale (1995) and
responds to criticisms of that paper by Bernheim (1996) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996).
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) raise a variety of issues. First, they claim that increasing
mortgage debt may, in the long run, increase saving. This is an odd claim on a number of
grounds. Since reducing mortgage debt raises wealth, it is hard to see how increasing mortgage
debt also should be interpreted as an increase in future wealth. If households repay the added
mortgage by reducing the amount of saving they do in other forms, then net saving will not
have increased. Moreover, households can always take out second mortgages or home equity
loans in the future; there is nothing permanent about paying off a mortgage. Finally,
Manchester and Poterba (1989) show that households with home equity loans have less net
worth, controlling for other factors. Thus, the most that can be said is that an increase in
mortgage debt is a reduction in current wealth.
PVW then present cohort analyses of saving incentive balances and home equity in 1984-7
and 1987-91. Their basic finding is that “the timing of changes in mortgage debt and net home
equity is inconsistent with a causal relationship between personal retirement plan contributions
and mortgage debt. ”
to saving incentives,
debt. From 1987-91,
They find that from 1984-7, a period of rapid increases in contributions
home equity rose and there was no countervailing increase in mortgage
the increase in personal retirement assetsslowed, but mortgage debt rose
rapidly.
These results, however, provide no evidence on the validity of the Engen and Gale
results. As Engen and Gale note and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (page 48) recognize, market
63trends in housing that are unlikely to be induced by saving incentives can have large effects on
equity values and mortgage markets; and the tax reform act of 1986 led to shifts in the
composition of debt toward mortgages. There is no suggestion in Engen and Gale that saving
incentives are driving the changes in the mortgage or housing markets. Obviously, the market
for mortgages is very large compared to saving incentive contributions and is affected by many
factors. Suppose those factors reduced mortgage debt before 1986and raised mortgage debt
after 1986, as PVW assert. The point made by Engen and Gale is that, after allowing for those
factors, and controlling for household characteristics, eligible households ended up with less
housing equity relative to ineligible households between 1987 and 1991. Examining the trends
across cohorts as PVW do in their cohort analysis, does not provide any information on how
eligibles fared relative to ineligibles (or on how participants fared relative to non-
participants).GO
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) then undertake wealth comparisons of eligible and
ineligible households in 1984 and 1991. These comparisons understate the wealth of eligible
households in 1984; m shown above, the degree of understatement is potentially quite large.
Thus, for example, the statement that financial asset holdings were similar for eligibles and
ineligibles in 1984is impossible to verify with the SIPP data.
In a revised version of their paper, Engen and Gale (1996) extend their results to cover
the 1984 to 1991 period. These results show a substantial reduction in non-401(k) wealth for
‘OPoterba, Venti and Wise (1996, page 48) note that “the home equity data may be subject
to time effects.” If that observation is true, it does not invalidate the Engen and Gale results,
because they focus on the difference between eligibles and ineligibles over time, so the time
effects are incorporated in the data for both groups. But if the home equity data are subject to
time effects, it seems likely that the financial asset data would be, too, which would invalidate
the within group cohort analysis of Venti and Wise (1996).
64eligible households relative to others. Estimating the impact of 401(k)s on total wealth of
course is difficult using the 1984sample due to missing data on 401(k)s and thrifts.
A second criticism by Poterba, Venti and Wise is that the comparison groups used by
Engen and Gale are not similar. This criticism is, at the very least, puzzling. The comparison
groups in Engen and Gale are chosen deliberately to mirror those in Poterba, Venti and Wise
(1995). The comparison groups are (a) eligible households versus ineligible households, (b)
eligibles with IRAs versus ineligibles with IRAs, and (c) eligibles without IRAs versus
ineligibles without IRAs. Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995) control for age, education, earnings,
and marital status within each comparison, and deem the groups similar. Engen and Gale
control for those variables plus pension coverage, race and sex of household head, a two-earner
indicator, and family size. Engen and Gale also stratify the groups by homeowner status. It is
hard to see how controlling for more variables would make the groups dissimilar.
A third criticism is that Engen and Gale require regression coefficients to be the same for
eligible and ineligible households, but Poterba, Venti and Wise claim it would be more
appropriate to allow the coefficients to differ across groups because the comparison groups
differ significantly.bl This distinction does not affect the results, however. Engen and Gale
(1996) provide estimates of a within-group (“like families”) estimator for the 1987-91 period and
obtain results that are very similar to Engen and Gale (1995). Engen and Gale (1996) also
provide within-group estimators and between-group estimators for the 1984 to 1991 period.
These estimates show a substantial reduction in non~Ol(k) wealth for eligible households
relative to ineligible households. Again, however, estimating the impact of 401(k)s, however, is
blWe note, however, that this criticism is only valid if eligible and ineligible households are
substantially different from each other, that is, if eligibility is not exogenous.
65made more difficult due to the absence of 401(k) balance data in 1984.
Finally, Poterba, Venti and Wise claim that exogenous changes in housing value bias the
Engen and Gale results toward finding no effect of 401(k)s on wealth. The claim is that
eligibles started with higher housing values and all housing values fell by about the same
percentage, resulting in large arithmetic declines for eligibles. These results do not control for
household characteristics. We note, however, that the Engen and Gale results demonstrate that
controlling for other factors, house value ~ for eligibles compared to ineligibles. To address
the issue further, Engen and Gale (1996) estimate the effects of 401(k)s on a wealth measure
that excludes house value. The remaining wealth variable (net financial resets minus mortgage
debt) does not rise for eligible households relative to ineligible households over time, thus
showing no effects of 401(k) eligibility y on wealth.
Bernheim (1996) raises a variety of additional issues. First, he claims the successive cross-
section results in both Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and Engen and Gale (1995) understate
the impact of 401(k)s due to “dilution,” which he describes as the problem that occurs if the
average “taste for saving” among eligible households falls over time. The logic of the claim is
that the most dedicated savers were most likely to become eligible for 401(k)s early on. As less
dedicated savers became eligible, average tastes for saving fell among eligible households over
time.
There are two ways to address these claims: first, looking only at eligible families over
time; second, comparing eligible and ineligible families over time. It is not at all clear that the
group of eligible families became more diluted. If participation in a saving incentive plan is
taken as an indicator of tastes for saving and dilution of the eligible sample were empirically
important, then-other things equal–it would be reasonable to expect that the proportion of
66401(k)-eligible workers making contributions would have fallen over time. Instead, data from
the Current Population Survey show that it rose from 57 percent in 1988 to 65 percent in 1993
(Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues 1996). This increase is unlikely to be due to an increase in
employer matching.A2 Our own probit analysis using the SIPP indicates that between 1987 and
1991, controlling for household characteristics (including pension coverage), the 401(k)
participation rate of eligible households rose by 8 percentage points, and the increase was
statistically significant .6’ Ippolito (1993) provides one explanation of these trends: 401(k)s are
more attractive to workers with higher tastes for saving, who value the opportunity to
contribute and receive employer-matching contributions. In his model, high savers are
attracted to, and remain at, firms that sponsor 401(k)s, while low savers are more likely to exit
the firm. Thus, the average tastes for saving plausibly rise over time among eligible workers.
The direction of the net bias caused by dilution is also unclear when comparing eligible
and ineligible households. Over time, the most dedicated savers among ineli~ible households
are the ones most likely to become eligible, so there is dilution among ineligible households.
The key issue is the relative dilution of the two groups, not the absolute dilution in one group.
Probits using the SIPP shows that controlling for household characteristics, IRA participation
’21n 1993, 60 percent of eligible workers that did not receive a match contributed. This is
larger than the overall 1988 average probability of contributing (Bassett, Fleming, and
Rodrigues 1996).
‘3Bernheim (1996) claims that trends in IRA participation are a “good indication” of
dilution. But dilution concerns unobservable characteristics (“tastes for saving”), whereas IRA
participation depends on observable and unobservable factors. Controlling for observable
factors, IRA participation among eligible households fell by s.4 percentage points from 1987 to
1991. Moreover, IRAs became less attractive relative to 401(k)s over time due to the phase out
of tax deductions after 1986 and the lower contribution limits, so eligible households would
naturally have substituted into 401(k)s to some extent
likelihood that eligible households participated in any
4.4 percentage points, controlling for other factors.
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(Engen,” Gale ~nd Scholz 1994). The
saving incentive–IRAs or 40I(k)s-rose byamong eligible households fell by only 1.3 percentage points relative to ineligible households
from 1987 to 1991, and saving incentive participation rose for eligibles relative to ineligible
households by 15 percentage points. Moreover, workers with low tastes for saving can and
frequently do liquidate their 401(k) upon leaving a firm, which raises the average tastes for
saving among eligible families and may reduce it among ineligible families.ti Thus, the bias
created could plausibly work in either direction, but more importantly it seems to us that
dilution is unlikely to be a major quantitative issue in interpreting the results described above.
Besides dilution, Bernheim offers a series of additional comments. First, he notes that the
effects of eligibility on wealth are estimated imprecisely in Engen and Gale (1995). However,
almost none of the point estimates in Engen and Gale (1995) would indicate any economically
significant effect of 401(k) eligibility on wealth, even if they were statistically significant. In
any case, to address this concern, Engen and Gale (1996) estimate the impact of eligibility on
non401 (k) wealth. The effects were uniformly large and negative and usually statistically
significant, consistent with 401(k)s not raising wealth.
Bernheim also suggests there may be measurement problems with the data on housing
wealth. But data problems would have generated the Engen and Gale results for homeowners
only if the measurement of housing equity became more negative from 1987 to 1991 for eligible
homeowners relative to ineligible homeowners. This seems implausible and Bernheim presents
no evidence to back this claim. Moreover, data problems in measuring housing value cannot
explain the EG results for renters.
Bernheim assertsthat the sample of eligible renters appears to be “more selected” than
that of eligible homeowners. However, 401(k) participation rates conditional on income, age
‘See Chang (1996) and Fernandez (1992).
68and eligibility are slightly lower for renters than for homeowners. This is not consistent with
Bernheim’s wsertion. Bernheim suggests there could be greater dilution of eligible renters over
time. Based on IRA participation, the data do not support this claim.G5
Bernheim also claims that low wealth among ineligible renters could invalidate the results,
because if economic forces were pushing down wealth in both groups of renters, ineligible
renters may not have been able to reduce their wealth much, due possibly to liquidity
constraints. However, if renters save almost nothing, as Bernheim notes, any increase in 401(k)
balances should have shown up very clearly as an increase in wealth. Eligibility did raise
financial assetsin absolute terms among homeowners, who have higher levels of wealth than
eligible renters, so there is little reason to see why, if 401(k)s raise wealth, eligibility y should not
also have raised renters’ financial assets.
Finally, Bernheim questions whether substitution between 401(k)s and housing equity is
plausible or likely. We discuss the various ways that substitution could occur in the text, and
note here that the Engen and Gale results do not require that all households with 401(k)s
substitute between saving incentives and housing equity. The Engen and Gale results refer to
changes in mean and median wealth, conditional on explanatory variables, so 401(k)s could
actually raise wealth for some people and the EG results could still hold.
Bernheim cites one study that finds that in the past-during a time period with high
returns to housing investment-retirees had been reluctant to reduce housing equity. But other
studies reach different conclusions (see Hurd 1995). And all of these studies may suffer from an
’51n 1987, controlling for other factors, eligible renters were about 2.2 percentage points
more likely to hold an IRA. In 1991, the corresponding figure was also 2.2 percentage points,
indicating no symptoms of dilution of the sample of eligible renters compared to the sample of
ineligible renters.
69important sample selection bias: elderly people who reduce their equity (by selling their house
and moving to another, or into a nursing home, or in with relatives) may get dropped from
subsequent waves of the survey. Most importantly, whether the elderly wish to consume their
housing equity is not directly relevant for interpreting the results in Engen and Gale (1995),
who (a) focus on workers, who are accumulating assets, rather than the elderly, who are
dissaving, (b) find evidence of reshuffling between mortgage debt and 401(lc)s, and (c) generally
do not find offset between house value and 401(k)s. Thus, even if people do not want to trade
off the size of their house for other consumption (elderly) or other assets (workers), they may
still reshuffle housing equity with 401ks through debt.
Along similar lines, Bernheim notes that many younger households say they view their
home equity primarily as a source of financial security. The relevance of his observation is
unclear. As Bernheim notes, surveys of people’s intentions warrant skepticism. Moreover,
Engen and Gale measure people’s actions, not their intentions. In addition, survey responses
about intentions notwithstanding, there were in fact several home equity lending booms in the
1980s and 1990s indicating that some households were taking equity out of their houses.
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Cohort Effects at Age 60-64’
All Households Aged 60-64 1984 1991 Difference
Mean Financial Assets 42,250 50,419 8,169
Mean Saving Incentives 5,118 14,156 9,038
Mean Other Financial Assets 37,132 36,263 -869
Contributors
Median Financial Assets 34,975 50,182 15,207
Median Saving Incentives 8,171 22,148 13,977
Median Other Financial Assets 22,983 21,528 -1,455
Non-Contributors
Median Financial Assets 2,687 2,134 -553
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996).Table 2
IRA Holders in the 1986 SCF2
Variable 1983 1986
Age of Head (Median) 42 45
Household Earnings (Median) 32,464 40,000
Home Ownership Rate 0.772 0.791
Housing Equity (Median) 39,398 45,168
Financial Assets3 (Median) 10,200 21,500
IRA plus Keogh 250 6,500
Other Financial Assets 7,699 12,000





I. All figuresarein ]991 dollars.The figuresrepresent conditionalmeansandmedians,controllingforage,
income, education, and marital status, based on data from the Surveys of IncomeandProgramParticipation. The
data omit balances in 401(k)s in 1984 and in afier-tax thrift plans in allyears.
2. All dollar figures are in nominal dollars.
3. Financial assets include stocks and mutual funds, bonds, checking and savings accounts, IRA and Keogh
accounts,money market accounts and certificates of deposit.
4. Net financial assets equals financial assets minus consumer debt.